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SUMMARY
•	 On	several	occasions	since	2001	Vladimir	Putin	has	raised	the	concept	
of	Greater	Europe	–	a	partly	integrated	common	space	comprising	main-
ly	Russia	and	the	European	Union.	This	concept	has	not	emerged	from	
a	void:	it	is	a	continuation	of	ideas	championed	by	Putin’s	predecessors:	
Boris	 Yeltsin	 and	Mikhail	 Gorbachev.	 It	 has	 re-emerged	 regularly	 as	
a	general	political	slogan,	and	was	conceptually	developed	only	in	2010.	
However,	it	has	never	been	recast	into	a	detailed	political	programme.	
It	 surfaced	 in	periods	of	 rising	political	dynamics	 in	 the	 relations	be-
tween	 the	West	 and	 Russia,	which	 either	 offered	 hope	 that	Moscow’s	
proposals	 could	 become	 reality,	 or	 created	 a	 perception	 that	 Russia’s	
interests,	 especially	 in	 the	area	of	 the	Commonwealth	of	 Independent	
States,	were	under	threat.
•	 The	concrete	outlines	of	the	Greater	Russia	project's	architecture	gradually	
took	shape	between	2002	and	2011.	They	presented	a	Greater	Europe	that	
would	consist	of	two	integration	blocs	–	the	Western	bloc	of	the	European	
Union,	with	Germany	in	the	dominant	role,	and	the	Eastern	bloc,	consist-
ing	of	the	emerging	Eurasian	Union,	with	Russia	in	a	hegemonic	position.	
By	 signing	 agreements	 and	 establishing	 joint	 institutions,	 the	 two	 blocs	
would	form	a	partly	integrated	area	of	security,	economic	and	energy	co-
operation,	 and	human	contacts.	However,	 the	 formation	of	 such	an	area	
would	not	lead	to	Russia	and	its	neighbours	gradually	adopting	European	
values	and	standards,	nor	would	 it	 limit	Russia’s	room	for	manoeuvre	 in	
foreign	policy	as	a	great	power	balancing	between	various	global	centres	
of	power.	The	priority	for	Kremlin	would	be	to	develop	the	Eastern	compo-
nent	of	Greater	Europe,	i.e.	Eurasian	integration	would	precede	all-Euro-
pean	integration.
•	 In	advocating	this	concept,	Vladimir	Putin’s	objectives	included:
1. strengthening	the	potential	of	Russia,	through	capital	and	technology	
transfers	from	Europe,	among	other	measures;
2. strengthening	Russia’s	influence	on	European	politics	and	security,	and	
on	the	economies	of	European	states,	including	through	the	creation	of	
co-operative	links	and	asset	swaps;
3. undermining	US	presence	and	influence	in	Europe;
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4. consolidating	Russia’s	hegemony	in	the	CIS	area,	getting	Europe	to	rec-
ognize	this	hegemony	and	preventing	political	and	economic	expansion	
of	the	EU,	the	US	as	well	as	China	in	the	CIS	area.
While	it	has	been	championed	as	"a	Europe	without	dividing	lines",	the	
Greater	 Europe	 concept	 would	 in	 practice	 permanently	 split	 Europe	
into	two	geopolitical	blocs.
•	 In	 recent	 years	 Russia	 has	 undertaken	 a	 number	 of	 initiatives	 aimed	 at	
implementing	some	elements	of	the	Greater	Europe	concept.	The	most	sig-
nificant	ones	included:	establishing	a	forum	for	dialogue	between	Russia,	
Germany	and	France	(the	Triangle);	putting	forward	the	initiative	to	sign	
a	new	European	Security	Treaty	and	proposing	a	draft	text;	presenting	(to-
gether	with	Germany)	a	proposal	 to	establish	an	EU-Russia	Political	 and	
Security	Committee;	presenting	an	outline	for	a	new	Energy	Charter;	and	
coming	up	with	an	 initiative	and	 the	draft	 text	 to	 sign	an	agreement	on	
visa-free	movement	between	the	EU	and	Russia.
•	 However,	most	of	Russia’s	initiatives	aimed	at	ultimately	creating	Great-
er	Europe	have	yet	to	become	reality.	This	shows	the	limits	of	Moscow’s	
efficacy	 in	pursuing	 the	project.	Russia,	 it	 seems,	has	overestimated	 its	
own	attractiveness	and	the	willingness	of	its	European	partners	to	make	
concessions	with	regard	to	the	future	shape	of	Europe’s	security	and	eco-
nomic	 architecture.	 Due	 to	 deepening	 political	 differences	 and	mount-
ing	contradictions	between	vital	economic	interests	of	the	two	sides,	the	
idea	of	Greater	Europe,	and	indeed	any	other	concept	to	build	a	common	
European	space	involving	Russia,	is	currently	a	political	utopia.	This	will	
not	change	until	Russia	starts	an	internal	transformation	to	espouse	Eu-
ropean	standards.
•	 In	this	context,	one	should	expect	Russia’s	policy	to	focus	on	implementing	
its	priority	project	of	Eurasian	integration,	based	on	the	structures	of	the	
Customs	Union	/	the	Common	Economic	Space	/	the	Eurasian	Union.	The	
Greater	Europe	project,	on	the	other	hand,	will	be	postponed	until	the	time	
when,	as	Moscow	believes,	the	weakened	EU	will	be	ready	to	accept	Rus-
sian	proposals.
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INTRODUCTION
Over	the	last	fifteen	years,	experts,	officials	and	politicians	in	Russia	have	been	
regularly	referring	to	Greater	Europe	(Большая Европа in Russian).	The	phrase	
has	been	used	 in	various	meanings.	 It	was	employed,	especially	 in	 the	early	
2000s,	by	those	Russian	experts	who	advocated	closer	co-operation	between	
Russia	and	the	West.	 In	 this	sense,	Greater	Europe	stood	for	some	 loose	 for-
mula	of	Russia’s	integration	with	the	European	Union.	High-ranking	Russian	
state	officials	(including	presidents	and	foreign	ministers)	have	regularly	used	
the	term	either	as	an	illustration	of	the	claim	that	Russia	is,	historically	and	
culturally,	a	European	state,	or	(often	in	the	phrase	“Greater	Europe	without	
dividing	lines”)	as	a	call	to	the	West	to	abandon	its	alleged	attempts	at	isolating	
Russia	or	 limiting	 its	 role	 in	regulating	 the	European	order	 (especially	with	
regard	to	security).	Finally,	the	term	has	also	been	used	in	a	narrow	sense	as	
a	synonym	of	the	European	Union	enlarged	in	2004.
However,	the	notion	of	Greater	Europe	has	also	sometimes	been	used	by	Rus-
sian	decision	makers	in	a	wider	sense	–	meaning	the	idea	to	crate	a	new	eco-
nomic	and	security	community	of	European	states,	based	on	a	mutual	exchange	
of	benefits,	and	with	Russia	as	a	full	member.	Understood	in	this	way,	Greater	
Europe	 is	 not	 a	 fully	 developed	 concept,	 but	 rather	 a	 slogan	 surrounded	 by	
loose	ideas	outlined	in	major	policy	statements	by	Russian	presidents.	Russia’s	
current	leader	Vladimir	Putin	has	been	particularly	vocal	on	Greater	Europe	
in	this	sense.
The	present	paper	aims	to	analyse	the	ideas	and	objectives	behind	the	Greater	
Europe	concept,	to	show	how	it	evolved	in	recent	years,	and	to	examine	its	im-
pact	on	the	practice	of	Russia’s	foreign	policy.	The	text	ends	with	a	brief	reflec-
tion	on	the	prospects	of	Greater	Europe	becoming	reality.
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I. GREATER EUROPE: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION  
OF THE CONCEPT
1. Mikhail Gorbachev’s idea of a “Common European Home”  
(late 1980s)
The	 idea	 of	Greater	Europe,	which	has	 been	present	 in	major	policy	 state-
ments	by	Russian	 leaders	since	the	mid-1990s,	did	not	emerge	from	a	void.	
It	clearly	parallels	an	earlier	concept	in	Soviet	policy,	that	of	a	“common	Eu-
ropean	home”.
The idea of a “Common European Home” first	surfaced	in	the	second	half	of	
the	1980s	as	a	political	slogan	related	to	the	“new	thinking”	in	the	Soviet	Union’s	
foreign	policy,	started	by	Mikhail	Gorbachev,	the	man	who	became	Secretary	
General	of	the	Communist	Party	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	1985	and	then	the	Presi-
dent	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	1988.	Gorbachev	included	the	term	in	a	number	of	
his	major	policy	statements	in	international	forums1.	While	the	idea	was	never	
transformed	into	a	detailed,	specific	and	coherent	concept,	its	general	outlines	
can	be	reconstructed	on	the	basis	of	Gorbachev’s	statements.	 Its	point	of	de-
parture	lay	in	the	realisation	that	the	Cold	War	between	two	antagonist	blocs,	
i.e.	the	West	and	the	Soviet	Union,	was	over,	and	the	conviction	that	rivalry	
should	give	way	to	co-operation	in	the	name	of	shared	values,	aimed	at	solv-
ing	joint	problems,	and	especially	at	ensuring	durable	security	and	prosperity	
“from	Vancouver	to	Vladivostok”.	Over	time,	this	general	idea	was	followed	by	
more	specific	proposals	 from	the	Soviet	Union:	 to	create	a	new	co-operative	
security	structure	based	on	the	Conference	on	Security	and	Co-operation	in	
Europe	(CSCE)	process;	to	revise	defence	strategies	and	reduce	armaments	in	
Europe;	 to	 start	 co-operation	between	NATO	and	 the	Warsaw	Pact,	 and	be-
tween	the	European	Communities	and	the	COMECON;	and	to	abolish	existing	
restrictions	on	technologically-advanced	exports	to	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	
countries	of	Soviet	bloc	(the	COCOM	system)2.
1	 During	his	visits	 to	Czechoslovakia	 in	April	 1987,	 to	Germany	 in	 June	 1989,	 to	France	 in	
July	1989	and	to	Italy	in	November	1989,	among	other	occasions.	Cf.	“Europe	as	a	Common	
Home”. Address	given	by	Mikhail	Gorbachev	to	the	Council	of	Europe,	Strasbourg,	6	July	
1989,	http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/gorbachev-speech-7-6-89_e3ccb87237.pdf	
2	 For	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 Gorbachev’s	 concept,	 see:	 Eugene	 B.	 Rumer,	 The	
German	Question	 in	Moscow’s	 “Common	European	Home”:	A	Background	 to	 the	Revolu-
tions	 of	 1989.	A	RAND	note,	RAND	Corp,	 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
notes/2009/N3220.pdf	
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Some	 of	 the	 Soviet	 proposals	were	 gradually	 put	 into	 practice,	 e.g.	 the	 CFE	
Treaty	on	the	reduction	of	conventional	 forces	 in	Europe	and	the	Charter	of	
Paris	 for	a	New	Europe	were	signed	at	 the	CSCE	summit	 in	November	1990,	
and	in	November	1991	NATO	revised	its	defence	strategy	and	decided	on	the	
establishment	of	formal	contacts	with	the	Warsaw	Pact.	However,	the	break-
up	of	the	Soviet	bloc	and	its	structures	in	the	years	1989–1991,	followed	by	the	
collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	itself	in	December	1991,	rendered	the	very	basis	of	
the	Common	European	Home	concept,	i.e.	inter-bloc	co-operation,	irrelevant.
2. Boris Yeltsin’s Greater Europe (1997)
In	the	new	(geo)political	conditions,	the	Russian	Federation	in	fact	took	over	
some	 of	 the	 Soviet	 projects,	 in	 changed	 form,	 and	 concentrated	 its	 efforts	
mainly	 on	 preventing	 the	 geopolitical	 status quo in	 Europe	 from	 changing	
further	to	the	benefit	of	the	West.	Such	was	the	intent	of	Russia’s	proposals	
concerning	a	new	European	security	architecture,	presented	in	the	first	half	
of	the	1990s,	as	Russia	ever	more	vigorously	objected	to	NATO’s	eastward	en-
largement	(see	below).
The idea of Greater Europe emerged	in	changed	circumstances.	Following	the	
fiasco	of	its	efforts	to	develop	a	new	model	of	European	security	alternative	to	
NATO,	Russia	seemed	to	have	opened	a	new,	more	positive	chapter	in	its	relations	
with	the	states	and	institutions	of	the	Euro-Atlantic	area:	it	became	a	member	of	
the	Council	of	Europe	(February	1996);	signed	the	Founding	Act	on	co-operation	
with	NATO,	which	established	a	new	 format	of	 relations	between	Russia	 and	
the	Alliance	(May	1997);	and	the	1994	EU-Russia	Partnership	and	Co-operation	
Agreement	entered	into	force	(December	1997),	establishing	a	basic	legal	and	in-
stitutional	framework	for	relations	between	Russia	and	the	European	Union.
The	Russian	President	Boris	Yeltsin	outlined	his	vision	of	Greater	Europe	dur-
ing	a	Council	of	Europe	summit	in	Strasbourg	on	10	October	1997.	He	said	on	
that	occasion:
“We are now poised to begin building together a new greater Europe without di-
viding lines; a Europe in which no single state will be able to impose its will on any 
other; a Europe in which large and small countries will be equal partners united 
by common democratic principles.
This Greater Europe can now become a powerful community of nations 
with a potential unequalled by any other region in the world and the 
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ability to ensure its own security. It can draw on the experience of the cultur-
al, national and historical legacies of all of Europe’s peoples. The road to greater 
Europe is a long and hard one but it is in the interest of all Europeans to take it. 
Russia will also help to realise this goal.”3
Some	key	thoughts	can	be	distilled	from	this	emphatic	statement.	Firstly,	Rus-
sia	should	be	an	equal	member	of	the	emerging	new	community	of	European	
states.	Secondly,	 that	 community	 should	be	powerful	 and	 independent,	 also	
in	terms	of	security.	Such	independence	would	have	to	imply	ending	Europe’s	
dependence	 on	 co-operation,	 and	 especially	 on	 security	 co-operation,	 with	
the	United	States,	and	working	more	closely	together	with	Russia	in	different	
spheres.	And	this,	it	seems,	was	the	subtext	of	this	initiative.
3. Vladimir Putin’s Greater Europe (2001, 2005)
Greater	Europe	re-emerged	as	a	trope	in	the	Russian	leadership's	rhetoric	four	
years	later.	It	happened	in	special	circumstances:	when	the	Western	world	was	
shaken	by	 the	 terror	attacks	 in	New	York	and	Washington	on	 11	September	
2001,	and	a	global	anti-terror	coalition	led	by	the	United	States	was	forming,	
to	which	Russia	also	offered	partial	backing.	At	that	point	Russia	seemed	to	be	
positively	reassessing	 its	relations	with	the	West	 (the	“pro-Western	turn”	 in	
the	Russian	Federation’s	foreign	policy)4,	while	the	Western	elites	were	start-
ing	a	debate	on	the	necessity	of	a	similar	reassessment	of	their	relations	with	
Russia	(which	resulted,	in	the	following	months,	in	the	strengthening	of	the	
institutional	frameworks	of	security	co-operation	between	NATO	and	Russia,	
and	between	the	EU	and	Russia)5.
The	Russian	president	Vladimir	Putin	presented	his	idea	of	Greater	Europe	in	
an	address	delivered	(mostly	in	German!)	to	the	German	Bundestag	on	25	Sep-
tember	2011.	Putin	said	on	that	occasion:
3	 The	text	in	Russian	in:	Diplomatichesky Vestnik,	issue	11,	1997;	the	text	in	English	at:	http://
www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=nosInvites&l=ca&sp=yeltsin	.
4	 Cf.	Marek	Menkiszak,	 The	 Pro-Western	 Turn	 in	 Russia's	 Foreign	 Policy:	 Causes,	 Conse-
quences	and	Prospects,	"CES	Policy	Briefs",	OSW,	Warsaw,	October	2002.	
5	 This	refers	in	particular	to	the	establishment	of	a	mechanism	of	regular	EU-Russia	consul-
tations	on	security	by	a	decision	of	the	summit	in	Brussels	in	October	2001	and	the	signa-
ture,	at	the	NATO-Russia	summit	in	Pratica	di	Mare	in	May	2002	of	the	declaration	“NATO-	
-Russia	 Relations:	 A	 New	 Quality”	 which	 established	 the	 NATO-Russia	 Council,	 among	
other	measures.	
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“It is my firm conviction that in today's rapidly changing world, in a world wit-
nessing truly dramatic demographic changes and an exceptionally high economic 
growth in some regions, Europe also has an immediate interest in promoting rela-
tions with Russia. No one calls in question the great value of Europe's rela-
tions with the United States. I am just of the opinion that Europe will re-
inforce its reputation of a strong and truly independent centre of world 
politics soundly and for a long time if it succeeds in bringing together its 
own potential and that of Russia, including its human, territorial and 
natural resources and its economic, cultural and defence potential.”6
The	statement	in	a	way	reiterated	and	elaborated	on	Yeltsin’s	idea.	The	differ-
ence	 lay	 in	 the	 fact	 that	Putin	 left	aside	 the	 liberal	and	democratic	rhetoric,	
and	pointed	to	national	interests	instead.	He	stressed	what	he	believed	were	
the	 shared	 challenges	 of	 Russia	 and	 Europe:	 the	 demographic	 development	
of	the	Muslim	world	and	the	rise	of	the	economic	might	and	competitive	edge	
of	China	and	some	other	Asian	states.	The	call	for	Europe’s	independence,	in	
fact	aimed	against	 the	United	States,	was	only	slightly	mitigated	by	 the	res-
ervations	made.	On	 the	other	hand,	Putin	clearly	outlined	Russia’s	assets	as	
a	potential	member	of	the	new	European	community,	and	by	doing	so,	identi-
fied	the	key	areas	of	proposed	integration	as	the	economy,	society	and	defence.	
It	was	no	accident	that	Putin’s	statement	was	delivered	in	Germany.	It	was	Ger-
many,	along	with	France,	that	Russia	regarded	as	its	prospective	main	partner	
in	the	pursuit	of	the	idea	of	Greater	Europe.
Indeed,	 Putin	 used	 the	 same	 rhetoric	 when	 addressing	 a	 French	 audience.	
In	May	2005	he	placed	an	op-ed	in	the	Le Figaro	daily.	The	context	of	the	pub-
lication	 is	 important.	 Several	 months	 before,	 Ukraine	 had	 undergone	 the	
Orange	Revolution,	which	 the	Russian	 leadership	 considered	 to	have	 in	 fact	
been	a	Western	(US-led)	geopolitical	offensive	against	Russia	and	Russian	in-
fluence	in	the	CIS	area.	The	EU	at	that	time	was	debating	ways	to	more	ener-
getically	build	closer	relations	with	Ukraine	and	the	other	Eastern	European	
participants	of	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy,	which	was	a	major	source	
of	concern	and	vexation	for	Moscow.	Also	important	in	terms	of	the	context	
of	Putin's	article	was	 the	agreement	on	 the	so-called	road	maps	 for	 the	 four	
common	spaces	between	the	EU	and	Russia,	reached	after	months	of	tedious	
negotiations,	which	defined	the	principles,	directions	and	some	general	objec-
tives	of	EU-Russia	co-operation	in	the	fields	of	economy,	security,	research	and	
6	 President	 Putin’s	 address	 to	 the	 Bundestag,	 25.09.2001,	 http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/
speeches/2001/09/25/0001_type82912type82914_138535.shtml	
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cultural	exchange	(the	documents	were	officially	signed	at	the	EU-Russia	sum-
mit	in	Moscow	on	10	May	2005)7.
In	the	article,	published	on	7	May	2005	on	the	occasion	of	the	60th	anniversary	
of	the	victory	over	Nazi	Germany,	Putin	wrote:
“I am deeply convinced: united Greater Europe from the Atlantic to the 
Urals, and in fact all the way to the Pacific Ocean, the existence of which will 
be based on universally recognised democratic principles, offers a unique chance 
for all the nations of the continent, including the Russian nation. Europeans can 
fully rely on Russia in the pursuit of this chance for a peaceful, prosperous and 
dignified future, as they could in the struggle against Nazism. We also believe 
that Russia’s efforts to develop integration bonds with both the EU mem-
ber states and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
are a single, organic process which should lead to a considerable expan-
sion of harmonious common spaces of security, democracy and business 
co-operation in this gigantic region.”8
The	Russian	 leader	 suggested	 in	 the	article	 that	Greater	Europe	should	con-
sist	of	two	pillars:	the	Western	pillar,	i.e.	the	European	Union,	and	the	Eastern	
pillar	managed	by	Russia.	The	reference	to	democratic	rhetoric	here	seems	to	
have	been	designed	to	convince	the	Western	audience	that	no	export	of	democ-
racy	to	the	East	was	necessary,	as	Russia	fully	recognised	the	basic	principles	
in	this	regard.	However,	the	article	was	primarily	a	call	on	Europe	to	recognise	
that	Russia’s	hegemonic	role	in	the	CIS	area	did	not	contradict	the	idea	of	all-
European	 integration.	That	 thought	had	already	been	raised	before	 in	state-
ments	by	high-ranking	Russian	officials	(see	below).
7	 For	 the	 full	 text	 of	 the	 four	 roadmaps,	 see:	 http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/roadmap_
economic_en.pdf	
8	 Статья Пре зи дента Российской Федерации В.В.Путина “Уроки победы над нацизмом: 
Через осмыс ление прошлого – к совместному строительству безопасного гуманного 
будущего”, опубликованная во французской газете “Фигаро” 7 мая 2005 года,	http://
www.mid.ru/ns-pobeda.nsf/304a70a9f8af4383c3256eda00378036/c3256eda00375761c3256f
fb0030159b?OpenDocument;	for	the	French	version,	see:	http://www.voltairenet.org/arti-
cle17014.html
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4.  Putin’s concept of Greater Europe takes shape (2010–2012)
On	 25	November	 2010,	 on	 the	 occasion	 of	 his	 visit	 to	 Germany,	 Vladimir	
Putin	published	another	major	policy	statement:	an	article	in	the	German	
daily	Süddeutsche Zeitung	in	which	he	elaborated	on	his	concept	of	Greater	
Europe	in	much	more	detail.	The	context	of	the	article	was	defined,	on	the	
one	hand,	by	the	efforts,	especially	in	the	EU,	to	find	ways	to	avoid	a	new	
financial	 and	 economic	 crisis	 like	 the	 one	 in	 2008-2009,	which	 had	 also	
affected	Russia,	 and	on	 the	other,	by	 the	process	of	 economic	 integration	
of	some	CIS	members,	which	was	progressing	rapidly	under	pressure	from	
Russia,	and	which	led	to	the	creation,	in	July	2010,	of	the	Customs	Union	of	
Russia,	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan.	Since	economic	challenges	were	seen	as	
the	most	 important	 issue	of	 the	day,	and	since	Putin	was	at	 that	 time	the	
prime	minister	of	Russia	(in	charge	of	economic	policy),	the	article	focused	
on	the	economy.
Referring	 to	 the	 shared	 experience	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 in	 Russia	
among	other	themes,	Putin	wrote:
“Europe needs its own vision of the future. We propose to shape it togeth-
er, through a Russia-EU partnership. It would be our joint bid for success 
and competitiveness in the modern world. (…) To alter the situation, we 
should exploit the advantages and opportunities available to both 
Russia and the EU. This could be a truly organic synergy of two econ-
omies – a classic and established EU model, and Russia's developing 
and new economy, with growth factors that complement each other 
well. We have modern technology, natural resources and capital for 
investment. Above all, we have unique human potential. Finally, Rus-
sia and the EU have ample cooperation experience. And I am happy to say 
that Germany, the engine of European integration, is setting an example of 
leadership in this area.”9
9	 Россия и Европа: от осмысления уроков кризиса – к новой повестке партнерства,	ar-
ticle	 by	 Prime	 Minister	 Vladimir	 Putin	 in	 Süddeutsche Zeitung,	 25.11.2010,	 http://www.
inosmi.ru/europe/20101125/164480740.html.	 For	 the	 German	 version,	 see:	 http://www.
sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/putin-plaedoyer-fuer-wirtschaftsgemeinschaft-von-lissab-
on-bis-wladiwostok-1.1027908.	For	the	English	version	see:	http://archive.premier.gov.ru/
eng/events/news/13088/	
14
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
0/
20
13
That	general	declaration	was	only	a	prelude	to	the	presentation	of	a	five-point	
plan	for	Great	Europe,	which	Putin	outlined	in	the	article.	The	plan	envisaged	
the	following:
1. “A harmonised community of economies, from Lisbon to Vladivostok”,	
which	in	future	could	perhaps	transform	into	a	free	trade	area	or	even	pur-
sue	some	more	advanced	forms	of	economic	integration.
This	community	would	be	built	in	gradual	steps	that	would	include	Russia’s	
membership	in	the	WTO,	harmonisation	of	legislation,	customs	procedures	
and	technological	standards,	and	elimination	of	bottlenecks	in	pan-Euro-
pean	transport	networks.
2. “A common industrial policy based on a synergy between the techno-
logical and resource potentials of the EU and Russia”
This	policy	would	be	implemented	through	joint	projects	to	support	small	
and	medium	enterprises	and,	even	more	importantly,	“a	fresh	wave	of	in-
dustrialisation”	based	on	the	establishment	of	strategic	sectoral	alliances	in	
the	shipbuilding,	automobile,	aviation,	space,	medical	and	pharmaceutical	
industries,	nuclear	energy	and	logistics.
3. “A common energy complex in Europe” 
The	 complex	 would	 comprise	 extended	 energy	 infrastructure,	 the	 Nord	
Stream	and	South	Stream	gas	pipelines,	and	would	be	governed	by	new	reg-
ulations,	including	a	new	energy	treaty	proposed	by	Russia,	which	would	
balance	 the	 interests	of	 suppliers,	buyers	and	final	 consumers	of	 energy.	
Russian	and	European	companies	would	share	energy	assets,	and	co-oper-
ation	would	be	developed	at	all	stages	(from	exploration	and	extraction	to	
delivery	 to	end	consumers).	Co-operation	would	also	extend	 to	education	
and	personnel	training,	creation	of	engineering	centres,	and	implementa-
tion	of	energy	efficiency	and	renewable	energy	projects.
4. Co-operation in science and education
It	would	 include,	among	other	measures,	 the	 implementation	of	 joint	re-
search	projects,	especially	for	applications	in	high	technology	industries,	
based	on	a	shared	financing	effort,	as	well	as	exchanges	of	researchers	and	
students,	traineeships,	etc.
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5. Elimination of barriers impeding human and business contacts
This	objective	would	be	achieved	by	abolishing	visas	for	travellers	between	
the	EU	and	Russia	based	on	a	clear	plan	and	definite	time	schedule.
In	 the	Süddeutsche Zeitung	 article	Putin	 in	effect	presented	a	very	ambitious	
strategic	vision	for	a	future	integrated	European	space	involving	Russia,	based	
on	extensive	industrial	and	technology	co-operation,	a	common	energy	sphere	
and	closer	human	contacts.	The	strategic	partnership	between	Russia	and	Ger-
many,	which	the	two	states	had	been	pursuing	for	years,	would	be	the	main	
axis	for	the	development	of	this	space.	At	the	same	time	Putin	made	it	clear	(by	
referring,	rather	awkwardly,	to	the	example	of	West	Germany’s	policy	towards	
the	German	Democratic	Republic	after	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	wall)	that	the	Eu-
ropean	side	should	not	expect	Russia	to	first	adopt	European	standards,	and	
should	integrate	with	Russia	as	it	is.
The	vision	of	Greater	Europe	presented	in	Germany	lacked	a	clear	reference	
to	the	integration	processes	in	the	CIS	area,	or	the	place	that	the	countries	of	
Russia	and	the	EU’s	“shared	neighbourhood”	would	occupy	in	the	new	Euro-
pean	architecture.	Putin	closed	this	gap	in	another	policy	article	published	on	
4	October	2011	in	the	Izvestia	daily.	The	text,	devoted	in	principle	to	the	idea	of	
a	Eurasian	Union	based	on	the	already	existing	Customs	Union	of	Russia,	Bela-
rus	and	Kazakhstan,	also	included	clear	references	to	the	concept	of	Greater	
Europe	as	a	space	comprising	two	blocs.
Putin	wrote:
“The Eurasian Union will be built on universal integration principles as 
an essential part of Greater Europe, united by shared values of freedom, 
democracy and marketlaws. (…) Soon, the Customs Union, and later the 
Eurasian Union, will join the dialogue with the EU. As a result, apart from 
bringing direct economic benefits, accession to the Eurasian Union will also help 
countries integrate into Europe sooner and from a stronger position. In addi-
tion, a partnership between the Eurasian Union and EU that is economi-
cally consistent and balanced will prompt changes in the geopolitical and 
geoeconomic setup of the continent as a whole with a guaranteed global 
effect.	(…) For example, take the two largest associations of our continent – the 
European Union and the Eurasian Union, currently under construction. In build-
ing cooperation on the principles of free trade rules and compatible regulation 
systems, they are in a position to disseminate these principles, including through 
16
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
0/
20
13
third parties and regional institutions, all the way from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
Oceans. They will thus create an area that will be economically harmonised, but 
that still remain diverse, when it comes to specific mechanisms and management 
solutions.”10
One	of	the	main	points	of	Putin’s	article	was	that	the	creation	of	the	Eurasian	
Union	not	only	did	not	contradict	the	idea	of	European	integration	(also	of	the	
“shared	neighbourhood”	countries),	but	was	 in	fact	an	 important	element	of	
such	integration.	Putin’s	message	was	addressed	to	the	elites	of	EU	countries	
but	also,	especially,	to	Ukraine.	The	Russian	leader	once	again	suggested	that	
the	development	of	Greater	Europe	would	be	of	major	significance	for	the	glob-
al	order	 (meaning	 in	 fact	 its	 ability	 to	effectively	compete	with	other	global	
power	centres,	especially	the	United	States	and	China).	The	novelty	in	Putin’s	
article	was	the	emphasis	on	the	argument	that	Greater	Europe	should	be	inte-
grated	economically,	but	not	politically.	The	Russian	leader	clearly	suggested	
that	the	creation	of	a	new	community	could	not	lead	to	any	restrictions	on	Rus-
sia’s	autonomy	to	make	its	own	decisions	as	a	state	and	the	leader	of	its	inte-
gration	bloc.	The	emphasis	on	 this	aspect	 seems	 to	have	been	related	 to	 the	
concerns	raised	in	the	Kremlin	by	the	revolutions	in	Arab	states,	which	started	
breaking	out	in	early	2011,	and	which	Putin	and	his	inner	circle	regarded	as	yet	
another	attempt	at	Washington-instigated	“export	of	democracy”,	 i.e.	 in	 fact	
a	manifestation	of	the	geopolitical	expansionism	of	the	United	States11.
The	Greater	 Europe	 concept	was	 raised	 once	more	 in	 another	 policy	 article	
by	Vladimir	Putin,	published	in	the	Moskovskiye Novosti	daily	on	27	February	
201212.	The	op-ed,	written	as	part	of	Putin’s	campaign	before	the	presidential	
elections	scheduled	in	March	2012,	outlined,	in	quite	personal	and	emotional	
tone	at	times,	the	leader’s	view	of	the	international	situation.	The	fragment	on	
Greater	Europe	only	briefly	restated	the	points	made	in	the	Süddeutsche Zeitung 
article.	It	was	notable,	however,	that	the	list	of	spheres	in	which	the	concept	
10	 Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается сегодня.	
article	 by	 Prime	 Minister	 Vladimir	 Putin	 in	 Izvestia,	 4October	 2011,	 http://izvestia.ru/
news/502761	
For	 the	 English	 version	 see:	 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/docu-
ments/d-ru/dv/dru_2013_0320_06_/dru_2013_0320_06_en.pdf	
11	 Cf.	M.	Menkiszak,	Responsibility	to	Protect	Itself?	Russia’s	strategy	towards	the	crisis	in	
Syria,	FIIA	Briefing	Paper	No.	131,	The	Finish	Institute	of	International	Affairs,	http://www.
fiia.fi/en/publication/341/responsibility_to_protect..._itself/	
12	 Россия и меняющийся мир,	article	by	Prime	Minister	Vladimir	Putin	in	Moskovskiye Novo-
sti,	27	February	2012,	http://mn.ru/politics/20120227/312306749.html	
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was	supposed	to	be	implemented	this	time	did	not	include	common	industrial	
policy	 and	 closer	 co-operation	 in	 research	 and	 education.	 Partly,	 this	 could	
have	been	due	to	a	different	choice	of	priorities	(in	favour	of	energy,	trade	and	
visa-free	travel),	but	Putin	could	also	have	concluded	that	the	European	Union,	
sliding	ever	deeper	into	its	crisis,	would	not	be	interested	in	an	extensive	offer	
from	Russia	that	would	include	major	investments	and	asset	swaps.
The	article	for	Moskovskiye Novosti	included	one	new	thought:	that	the	develop-
ment	of	Greater	Europe	or	the	Union	of	Europe	(Putin	also	used	this	alterna-
tive	name	of	the	project,	promoted	mainly	by	the	 influential	Russian	expert	
Sergei	Karaganov13)	was	designed,	inter alia,	to	strengthen Russia’s capabili-
ties and position in its economic turn towards the “new Asia”.	Given	that	
the	article	juxtaposed	two	contrasting	images:	the	crisis-stricken	Europe	and	
the	dynamic	growth	of	China’s	might,	 that	 could	be	 interpreted	as	a	way	 to	
instrumentally	use	the	Russian-European	co-operation	in	order	to	further	the	
development	of	Russia’s	economic	relations	with	China	and	other	Asian	states	
(which	Vladimir	Putin	advocated	in	the	article).
13	 Cf. К Cоюзу Европы. Аналитический доклад российской группы международного дис­
куссионного клуба «Валдай»,	 31	 August	 -	 7	 September	 2010,	 http://www.svop.ru/files/
meetings/m010613371680911.pdf	 The	 report	 claims	 that	 unless	 they	 join	 forces,	 the	 EU	
and	Russia	will	become	marginalised	globally.	The	authors	 (S.	Karaganov,	T.	Bordachev,	
I.	Ivanov,	F.	Lukyanov	and	M.	Entin)	call	for	the	conclusion	of	a	Treaty	on	the	Union	of	Eu-
rope,	followed	by	a	series	of	sectoral	agreements	to	create	a	single	energy	system	and	com-
mon	security,	economic	and	human	relations	spaces.	
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II. GREATER EUROPE: ATTEMPTS AT PUTTING  
THE CONCEPT INTO PRACTICE
The	general	ideas	present	in	the	rhetoric	of	Russian	leaders	who	spoke	about	
Greater	Europe	were	not	detached	from	Russia’s	foreign	policy	practice	in	Eu-
rope.	 Russian	 diplomacy	 formulated	 and	 tried	 to	 implement	 initiatives	 that	
were	in	line	with	the	Greater	Europe	concept.
1. The Russia-Germany-France Triangle: Greater Europe’s core that 
never came into being
One	of	the	most	tangible	manifestations	of	Russia’	Greater	Europe	policy	came	
with	the	attempt	at	creating	a	forum	for	regular	political	dialogue	with	Ger-
many	and	France,	Moscow’s	main	partners	in	Europe	and	the	two	countries	
it	 perceived	 as	 the	driving	 force	 of	 the	European	Union.	The	Russian	presi-
dent	Boris	Yeltsin	put	forward	the	initiative	to	establish	such	dialogue	during	
a	Council	of	Europe	summit	in	October	1997,	i.e.	at	the	same	time	he	announced	
the	Greater	Europe	concept,	which	suggests	that	the	Triangle	was	intended	as	
a	way	to	further	the	implementation	of	Greater	Europe.	The	German	chancel-
lor	Helmut	Kohl	and	the	French	president	Jacques	Chirac	accepted	Yeltsin’s	in-
vitation	and	met	him	on	26	March	1998	at	the	Bor	residence	near	Moscow.
The	Triangle	was	intended	to	not	only	build	Russia’s	prestige,	but	also	serve	as	
Moscow’s	 instrument	 to	 influence	European	politics.	 In	Russia’s	 intention,	 its	
meetings	were	supposed	to	take	place	regularly	and	provide	a	platform	through	
which	Russia	could	informally	co-decide	on	important	European	policy	issues.	
The	partners,	however,	did	not	share	this	approach,	which	found	its	most	visible	
expression	in	the	disagreements	at	the	Triangle	summit	in	Istanbul	in	Novem-
ber	1999,	which	Yeltsin	in	effect	broke	off14.	The	next	meeting	in	the	Triangle	for-
mat	took	place	only	in	April	2003	when	the	similar,	critical	attitudes	of	the	three	
states	towards	the	US-British	armed	intervention	in	Iraq	provided	a	good	basis	
to	resume	consultations	in	this	formula.	From	then	on,	the	Triangle	meetings	
would	usually	take	place	once	a	year,	with	the	exception	of	the	year	2005	when	
14	 The	meeting	between	President	Boris	Yeltsin,	Chancellor	Gerhard	Schröder	and	President	
Jacques	Chirac	at	the	OSCE	summit	in	Istanbul	on	18	November	1999	formally	took	place,	
but	lasted	for	less	than	10	minutes	before	the	Russian	president	ostensibly	left	the	summit	
over	disputes	concerning	the	war	in	Chechnya.	
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the	leaders	met	twice15,	but	were	stopped	in	2007	after	Nicolas	Sarkozy	came	to	
power	in	France,	and	resumed	again	only	on	one	occasion,	in	2010,	when	Dmi-
tri	Medvedev	was	the	president	of	Russia16.	During	the	Triangle	meetings,	the	
leaders	discussed	the	most	important	international	issues	of	the	day,	EU-Russia	
relations	and	multilateral	economic	co-operation	projects.	However,	none	of	the	
Triangle	meetings	brought	about	any	major	new	initiatives,	and	the	forums	only	
significance	remained	as	an	image-building	measure.
2. Common spaces
Russia’s	 initiatives	 in	 the	spheres	of	 security,	 economic/energy	co-operation	
and	human	contacts	were	also	part	of	the	efforts	to	practically	implement	the	
Greater	Europe	concept.	They	largely	overlapped	with	the	four	so-called	Com-
mon	Spaces	of	Russia	and	the	EU17,	which	were	first	formally	mentioned	at	the	
EU-Russia	summit	in	St.	Petersburg	in	May	2003,	followed	by	the	signature	of	
the	Roadmaps	to	the	implementation	of	the	Common	Spaces	at	the	EU-Russia	
summit	in	Moscow	in	May	2005.
2.1. The security space
The	USSR	first	called	for	the	creation	of	a	new architecture of European se-
curity back	in	the	late	1980s.	The	Russian	Federation	continued	those	efforts	
in	the	1990s.	Russia’s	concept	of	an	all-European	partnership,	and	its	proposals	
for	an	institutional	reform	of	the	CSCE	(1994)	triggered	a	formal	dialogue	on	
the	subject,	which	led	to	the	adoption	of	the	Charter	for	European	Security	at	
the	OSCE	summit	in	Istanbul	in	November	199918.	However,	contrary	to	Rus-
sia’s	initial	proposals,	the	document	was	not	legally	binding	and	did	not	estab-
lish	any	new	institutions	through	which	Russia	could	co-decide	on	European	
security	issues.
15	 The	meetings	 took	place	 on	 11	April	 2003	 in	St.	 Petersburg	 (Putin,	 Schröder,	Chirac),	 on	
31	August	2004	 in	Sochi,	on	 18	March	2005	 in	Paris	 (that	meeting	also	 included	 the	new	
Spanish	Prime	Minister	Jose	Luis	Zapatero,	but	Spain	did	not	permanently	join	the	group)	
and	on	3	July	in	2005	in	Svetlogorsk.	In	the	meeting	in	Compiegne	on	23	September	2006	the	
newly	elected	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	represented	Germany.	
16	 On	19	October	2010	in	Deauville	Chancellor	Merkel	and	President	Sarkozy	met	with	Presi-
dent	Medvedev.	
17	 This	refers	to:	the	Common	Economic	Space;	Common	Space	of	Freedom,	Security	and	Jus-
tice,	the	Common	Space	of	External	Security	and	the	Common	Space	of	Research	and	Edu-
cation,	including	cultural	aspects.	Cf.	footnote	7.	
18	 See:	 the	Charter	 for	 European	Security,	 Istanbul,	November	 1999,	 http://www.osce.org/
mc/17502	
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Russia	made	another	effort	to	change	this	state	of	affairs	in	June	2008	when	
the	newly	elected	Russian	president	Dmitri	Medvedev	came	up	with	an	initia-
tive	to	call	an	all-European	conference	with	a	view	to	signing	a	treaty	on	Eu-
ropean	security	that	would	establish	a	new	security	system	in	the	continent.	
Russia’s	declarations	in	this	regard,	which	were	initially	very	general,	gradu-
ally	gained	a	more	concrete	shape,	and	ultimately,	in	November	2009,	Russia	
publicly	presented	its	draft	Treaty on European Security19.
Russia’s draft Treaty on European Security
The	draft	is	a	fairly	short	and	general	document	comprising	fourteen	ar-
ticles.	It	commits	all	parties	(potentially,	the	countries	of	North	America,	
Europe	 and	 the	 Commonwealth	 of	 Independent	 States,	 and	multilateral	
structures:	the	EU,	OSCE,	NATO,	CSTO	and	CIS)	to	follow	the	principles	of	
equality	and	indivisibility	of	security	(which	forbids	protecting	one	mem-
ber’s	security	at	the	expense	of	others).	Thus,	the	document	obligates	the	
parties	to	refrain,	individually	and	collectively,	from	any	action	that	could	
affect	the	security	interests	of	other	members;	to	refrain	from	using	their	
respective	territories	to	carry	out	or	assist	armed	aggression	against	any	
other	member,	and	from	any	other	actions	that	could	undermine	the	se-
curity	of	other	members;	to	seek	to	ensure	respect	for	the	above	principles	
within	multilateral	organisations;	to	provide,	at	the	request	of	any	Treaty	
member,	 information	on	any	measures	 that	 could	affect	 security;	 and	 to	
refrain	from	accepting	international	commitments	that	run	counter	to	the	
provisions	of	the	Treaty.
The	draft	also	provides	for	a	conflict	resolution	mechanism.	It	enables	all	
members	who	believe	that	their	security	interests	are	or	might	be	affected	
to	call	a	consultation	of	the	other	members	concerned	and,	once	such	con-
sultations	have	been	held,	to	call	(at	the	request	of	at	least	two	members)	
a	conference	of	parties.	The	decisions	of	the	conference	are	binding	on	the	
members	 if	at	 least	 two	 thirds	of	 the	 total	number	of	parties	participate	
and	the	decisions	are	unanimous.	In	the	event	of	armed	aggression	against	
a	member,	the	party	that	has	been	attacked	may	call	an	extraordinary	con-
ference	of	parties,	whose	decisions	will	be	binding	if	at	least	four	fifths	of	
the	total	number	of	members	participate	and	the	decisions	are	taken	unan-
imously.
19	 For	the	draft	text,	see:	http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-dos.nsf/europeansecurity	
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The	Treaty	would	be	open	for	signature	to	countries	of	North	America,	Eu-
rope	and	the	CIS	area,	as	well	as	the	multilateral	organisations	of	the	EU,	
OSCE,	NATO,	CSTO	and	CIS,	and	would	enter	into	force	once	ratified	by	at	
least	25	states	or	multilateral	organisations.	Other	states	and	multilateral	
organisations	could	accede	to	the	Treaty	subject	to	the	consent	of	all	par-
ties.	The	draft	provides	that	any	member	might	withdraw	from	the	treaty	if	
it	determined	that	extraordinary	circumstances	endangered	its	interests.
The	document	contains	no	definition	of	a	situation	affecting	a	party’s	se-
curity,	which	would	inevitably	lead	to	fully	discretional	and	subjective	as-
sessment	of	threats.	Thus,	if	the	Treaty	were	adopted	in	the	original	form,	
a	number	of	security	issues	which	are	currently	considered	to	be	internal	
affairs	of	NATO	or	its	members	and	partners	would	become	legitimate	sub-
jects	of	formal	debate	with	Russia.	While	Moscow	would	not	necessarily	be	
able	to	block	security	decisions	of	NATO,	the	EU	or	the	OSCE,	it	could	use	
the	mechanisms	 laid	down	in	 the	Treaty	 to	effectively	discourage	demo-
cratic	Western	states	from	undertaking	initiatives	it	found	unacceptable.	
Formally,	the	Western	states	could	apply	similar	measures	to	Russia,	but	
in	practice	that	would	be	ineffective	as	the	undemocratic	Russian	govern-
ments	are	much	less	susceptible	to	pressure	from	the	West	(especially	as	
the	Treaty	allows	a	member	to	withdraw	without	any	problems	and	with-
out	having	to	meet	any	conditions).
The	Russian	draft	also	provides	for	a	new	mechanism	for	conflict	resolu-
tion	between	states,	parallel	to	the	UN	conflict	resolution	system.	However,	
it	is	doomed	to	be	ineffective	because	of	the	–	completely	unrealistic	–	re-
quirement	of	unanimity	in	decision-making.	Such	a	system	would	not	only	
be	incapable	of	resolving	any	conflict	situations,	but	could	also	hinder	ef-
fective	involvement	of	Western	states	and	security	structures	in	the	regu-
lation	of	conflicts	such	as	the	Russian-Georgian	conflict	in	2008.
The	 provisions	 of	 the	 Treaty	 were	 controversial;	 hence	 it	 was	 not	 surpris-
ing	that	Western	states	generally	remained	reserved	about	the	initiative.	Al-
though	regular	debate	on	the	Treaty	was	formally	launched	in	June	2009	under	
the	auspices	of	the	OSCE	(the	so-called	Corfu	Process),	it	has	not	produced	any	
tangible	results.
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	Russia-EU Security Dialogue, initiated	 in	October	
2000,	did	gain	a	more	institutionalised	character	a	year	later	with	the	launch	
of	regular	meeting	of	the	Troika	of	the	EU	Political	and	Security	Committee	
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and	representative	of	Russia.	However,	Russia’s	proposals	to	create	a	new	body	
(council)	for	consultation	and	co-ordination	of	security	policies	between	Rus-
sia	and	the	EU,	put	forward	after	the	establishment,	in	2002,	of	the	NATO-Rus-
sia	Council	which	Moscow	viewed	as	a	point	of	reference,	met	with	resistance	
from	a	large	number	of	EU	member	states.	It	was	only	at	the	German-Russian	
summit	 in	Meseberg	 in	 June	2010	 that	 the	 informal	discussions	finally	 took	
the	form	of	a	bilateral	initiative	to	establish	a	Russia-EU	Political	and	Security	
Committee	(meetings	between	the	Russian	minister	for	foreign	affairs	and	the	
EU	High	Representative	for	the	Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy,	devoted	
to	current	policy	and	international	security	issues,	joint	EU-Russia	crisis	re-
sponse	operations	and	other	issues	requiring	co-operation,	including	crises)20.	
The	German	side	expected	Russia	to	adopt	a	more	constructive	approach	to	the	
Transnistrian	crisis	 (the	Meseberg	memorandum	explicitly	provided	for	co-
operation	on	 this	 issues),	which	never	happened,	and	 therefore	 the	chances	
that	the	initiative	will	become	reality	at	some	point	are	slim.
2.2. The economic and energy space
The	idea	of	a	Common European Economic Space of	the	EU	and	Russia	was	
first	put	forward	at	the	EU-Russia	summit	in	May	200121.	At	that	time,	however,	
the	two	sides	run	into	serious	difficulties	trying	to	define	it.	A	special	work-
ing	group	elaborated	the	concept	in	November	200322,	however,	the	document	
it	produced	turned	out	to	be	very	general.	The	roadmap	signed	in	May	2005	
provided	only	slightly	more	detail.	 In	 those	 two	documents23	Russia	and	 the	
EU	declared	that	they	would	seek	to	create	“an	open	and	integrated	market”	
based	on	common	or	comparable	principles	and	regulations.	It	would	be	based	
20	 Memorandum	(meeting	between	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	and	President	Dmitri	Medve-
dev	on	4	and	5	June	2010	in	Meseberg,	Germany).	The	document	has	been	removed	from	the	
German	government	website,	available	in	the	author’s	archive.	
21	 The	name	was	first	used,	to	the	surprise	of	all	summit	participants,	by	the	then	President	
of	the	European	Commission	Romano	Prodi.	The	Russian	side	then	took	it	up.	The	parties	
agreed	to	establish	a	special	high-level	working	group	to	develop	the	concept.	
22	 It	was	the	result	of	an	intense	intellectual	effort,	 in	which	both	Russia	and	the	EU,	drew	
on	commissioned	and	non-commissioned	studies	and	expert	papers.	For	more	information	
about	works	on	the	concept	and	the	results	see:	Evgeny	Vinokurov,	The	Making	of	the	Con-
cept	of	the	EU	–	Russia	Common	Economic	Space,	Chair	Interbrew	–	Baillet	Latour	Work-
ing	Papers	no.22,	Catholic	University	of	Louvain,	http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/ibl/docs_ibl/
WP22-Vinokurov.pdf
23	 See:	The	Common	European	Economic	Space	(CEES)	Concept	Paper,	Rome,	6	November	2003,	
http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2003/11/55356.shtml	;	Road	Map	for	the	Common	Eco-
nomic	Space	–	Building	Blocks	for	Sustained	Economic	Growth,	Moscow,	10.05.2005,	http://
eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/roadmap_economic_en.pdf	
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on	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Partnership	 and	 Co-operation	 Agreement	 between	
the	EU	and	Russia	(PCA)	and	the	terms	and	conditions	of	Russia’s	accession	to	
the	WTO.	The	Common	Space	was	to	encompass	selected	sectors	in	the	initial	
phase,	and	then	be	extended	to	all	branches	of	the	economy.	Its	implementa-
tion	mechanism	would	be	based	primarily	on:	gradual	abolition	of	barriers	to	
the	free	flow	of	goods,	services,	capital	and	workers,	gradual	harmonisation	
of	standards	and	procedures,	development	of	transport	 infrastructures,	and	
research	and	technology	co-operation.	The	detailed	solutions	that	were	miss-
ing	from	the	two	documents	were	to	be	added	in	separate	Action	Plans	and	new	
sectoral	agreements	or	protocols	to	the	PCA.
Russia’s accession to the WTO	was	a	key	element	and	a	precondition	of	the	
future	 gradual	 implementation	 of	 the	 Common	 European	 Economic	 Space.	
However,	the	market	access	protocol	signed	by	Russia	and	the	EU	in	May	2004	
failed	to	resolve	all	the	contentious	issues	between	the	two	sides,	and	it	took	
many	rounds	of	tedious	negotiations	and	a	string	of	unexpected	turns	(includ-
ing	a	nearly	two	years-long	impasse	into	which	the	parties	ran	in	autumn	2009	
after	Russia	called	for	the	emerging	Customs	Union	to	be	included	in	the	ne-
gotiations)	for	Russia	and	the	EU	to	ultimately	reach	an	agreement	in	Decem-
ber	2011.	That	deal	paved	the	way	to	Russia’s	accession	to	the	WTO,	formally	
sealed	in	August	2012.	Still,	the	EU’s	hopes	for	deeper	trade	liberalisation	and	
harmonisation	 of	 laws	with	 Russia	 after	 its	 accession	 (the	 so-called	WTO+)	
failed	to	materialise.	Talks	on	this	subject,	conducted	as	part	of	the	negotia-
tions	concerning	the	new	EU-Russia	 legal	 framework,	became	stalemated	in	
2010	when	the	Russian	side	insisted	that	the	Commission	of	the	Customs	Union	
(transformed	in	early	2012	into	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission)	should	be	
the	European	Commission’s	partner	at	 the	negotiating	 table.	At	 that	point	 it	
became	clear	that	Moscow	was	trying	to	force	the	European	Union	to	recognise	
the	Customs	Union,	and,	in	the	longer	term,	the	Common	Economic	Space	and	
the	Eurasian	Union,	as	the	partners	for	dialogue	and	conclude	formal	agree-
ments	with	 the	bloc24.	 For	 the	EU,	 this	was	problematic	not	 only	politically,	
but	also	legally,	as	the	other	members	of	the	Customs	Union,	i.e.	Kazakhstan	
and	Belarus,	were	not	WTO	members	and	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission	
could	not	make	legally	binding	commitments.
Gradual harmonisation of legal regulations and standards between	the	EU	
and	Russia	was	supposed	to	be	at	the	core	of	the	development	of	the	Common	
24	 Vladimir	Putin	publicly	suggested	this	much	during	the	EU-Russia	summit	in	Yekaterin-
burg	on	4-5	June	2013.	
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European	 Economic	 Space.	 The	 EU's	 understanding	 of	 this	was	 that	 Russia	
would	adopt	parts	of	the	EU	acquis,	or	at	least	regulations	modelled	on	it25.	Rus-
sia’s	position,	on	the	other	hand,	was	unclear.	While	declaratively	supporting	
the	harmonisation	of	regulatory	frameworks,	the	Russian	side	seemed	to	as-
sume	 that	 the	 two	parties	would	 jointly	 formulate	new	regulatory	 solutions	
and/or	that	Russia	would	adopt	the	more	universal	regulatory	frameworks	(es-
pecially	of	the	WTO	and	the	OECD).	No	legal	or	institutional	mechanism	was	
ever	established	in	Russia	to	examine	the	compatibility	of	Russian	legislation	
with	the	EU	rules.	The	parties	merely	exchanged	selected	information	on	new-
ly-adopted	rules	during	irregular	meetings	of	working	groups	and	subgroups26.	
Some	of	the	meetings	concerned	the	harmonisation	of	technical	standards	and	
took	 part	within	 the	 framework	 of	 a	 project	 implemented	 under	 the	 TACIS	
programme,	and	after	2010	–	within	the	framework	of	projects	implemented	
under	 the	auspices	of	 the	Partnership	 for	Modernisation	 (see	below)27. Even	
though	Russia	 occasionally	made	positive	 declarations	 about	 its	willingness	
to	harmonise	regulations,	the	real	effects	of	dialogue	in	this	sphere	remained	
very	limited28.
Energy	issues	have	been	the	highest	priority	for	Russia	when	it	comes	to	eco-
nomic	relations	with	the	EU.	The	reason	for	this	lies	in	the	objective	fact	that	
Russian	exports	to	the	EU	are	dominated	by	energy	resources	(oil	and	natural	
25	 Such	 an	 understanding	 was	 suggested	 already	 in	 the	 EU-Russia	 Partnership	 and	 Co-
-operation	Agreement	 (PCA)	of	 1994	 (especially	Article	 55).	The	PCA	 included	provisions	
on	possible	future	establishment	of	a	free	trade	area	between	the	EU	and	Russia	(Article	1,	
Article	3).	See:	the	Agreement	on	Partnership	and	Cooperation,	establishing	a	partnership	
between	the	European	Communities	and	their	Member	States,	of	one	part,	and	the	Russian	
Federation,	on	the	other	part,	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CE
LEX:21997A1128(01):EN:HTML	
26	 Such	meetings	should	have	taken	place	at	least	twice	a	year,	but	in	practice	some	groups	
and	subgroups	failed	to	meet	for	two	consecutive	years,	and	some	held	no	meetings	at	all.	
See:	the	EU-Russia	Common	Spaces	Progress	Report	2012,	Brussels,	March	2013,	http://eeas.
europa.eu/russia/docs/commonspaces_prog_report_2012_en.pdf	
27	 The	 project	 "Approximation	 of	 EU	 and	 Russian	 Federation	 technical	 regulation,	 stand-
ardisation	 and	 certification	 systems"	worth	 €	 2.5	million,	 implemented	 between	August	
2009	and	December	2011.	See:	http://eu-rf.org/	In	May	2013,	two	new	projects	were	inau-
gurated	 concerning	 technical	 standardisation	within	 the	 framework	 of	 Partnership	 for	
Modernisation.	 See:	 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/press_corner/all_news/
news/2013/20130523_en.htm	
28	 Even	the	European	Commission	admitted	this	officially	in	its	reports,	which	identified	only	
one	concrete	achievement	of	the	process,	i.e.	the	harmonisation	of	Russian	phytosanitary	
standards	concerning	the	presence	of	20	chemical	substances	in	plant	protection	products.	
See:the	 EU-Russia	 Common	 Spaces	 Progress	 Report	 2012,	 op.cit.	 Cf.	 EU-Russia	 Common	
Spaces	 Progress	 Report	 2010,	 Brussels,	 March	 2011,	 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/
docs/commonspaces_prog_report_2010_en.pdf	
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gas)	which	also	constitute	the	main	source	of	revenue	for	the	Russian	budget29.	
The Energy Dialogue between Russia and the EU became	formalised	in	Oc-
tober	2000.	 It	produced	a	number	of	agreements	and	arrangement,	many	of	
which	were	beneficial	for	Russia.	They	concerned,	among	other	issues,	support	
for	 the	 development	 of	 energy-efficient	 technologies,	 honouring	 of	 existing	
long-term	contracts	for	the	supplies	of	Russian	natural	gas	and	nuclear	fuels	to	
selected	EU	member	states,	and	the	inclusion	of	selected	infrastructural	pro-
jects	backed	by	Russia	into	the	EU	list	of	priority	projects.
Over	time,	however,	the	EU-Russia	dialogue	revealed	more	and	more	conten-
tious	issues.	Russia	not	only	failed	to	ratify	the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	(ECT)	
regulating	the	European	and,	in	the	longer	term,	global	energy	co-operation,	
which	it	had	signed	in	1994,	but	in	July	2009	officially	withdrew	its	signature	
under	the	Treaty.	The	Russian	side	was	dissatisfied	mainly	with	the	Treaty’s	
provisions	on	guarantees	of	third-party	access	to	transport	infrastructure	and	
the	 absence	 of	 provisions	 imposing	heavier	 obligations	 on	 the	 transit	 coun-
tries,	which	Russia	had	called	for.
Shortly	before,	in	April	2009,	Russia	presented	its	own	draft	outline	of	the	pro-
jected	new	agreement.	The	document,	titled	Concept of a new legal basis for inter-
national energy co-operation (objectives and principles),	repeated	a	number	of	ECT	
provisions,	but	put	more	emphasis	on	respecting	the	interests	of	the	energy-
producing	countries	and	the	principle	of	“security	of	demand”30.
Russia’s proposals for a new Energy Charter
The	 short,	 five-page	 document	 consisted	 of	 the	 principal	 text	 outlining	
the	objectives	and	guiding	principles	of	the	new	agreement,	and	two	an-
nexes:	a	draft	of	new	provisions	concerning	transit	guarantees,	and	a	list	
of	 energy	 resources	 and	 products.	 Russia’s	main	 declared	 objective	was	
to	create	a	new,	universal	and	 legally	binding	agreement	 to	 regulate	en-
ergy	co-operation,	one	that	would	be	open,	comprehensive,	equal	and	non-
-discriminatory.	It	should	be	based,	among	other	things,	on	the	principles	
29	 Energy	resources	accounted	for	76.5%	of	Russian	exports	to	the	EU	in	2012.	For	more	infor-
mation	on	EU-Russia	trade,	see:	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-13-83_en.htm	
Revenue	from	energy	exports	accounted	for	70.4%	of	total	export	revenue,	50.5%	of	budget	
revenue	and	around	17%	of	Russian	GDP	in	2012.
30	 The	 document	 was	 delivered	 to	 the	 European	 Commission,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 G8,	 G20	 and	
CIS	 countries	 on	 20	 April	 2009.	 For	 the	 full	 text,	 see:	 http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/
docs/2009/04/215303.shtml	
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of	indivisibility	of	energy	security,	mutual	responsibility	of	suppliers,	buy-
ers	and	transit	countries,	security	of	supply	as	well	as	demand,	respect	for	
the	sovereignty	of	energy	resources,	and	non-discrimination	in	access	to	
energy	markets	 and	 technologies,	 support	 for	 asset	 swaps	 and	 research	
and	 technology	 co-operation,	 protection	 of	 investments	 and	 infrastruc-
ture,	 and	 the	 obligation	 to	 consult	 and	 co-ordinate	 energy	 policies	 and	
regulations.	The	agreement	would	 impose	a	wide	 range	of	 commitments	
on	the	transit	countries,	including	a	prohibition	to	stop	transit	or	interfere	
with	it,	liability	for	losses	suffered	as	a	result	of	non-performance	of	transit	
agreements,	an	obligation	to	establish	bodies	to	regulate	crisis	situations	
with	equal	participation	of	all	stakeholders,	an	obligation	to	give	priority	to	
diplomatic	dispute	resolution	rather	than	judicial	mechanisms,	and	a	pro-
hibition	to	make	reservations	to	the	signed	agreement.
The	content	of	the	document	reflected	Russia's	specific	interests,	related	in	
particular	 to	Moscow's	conflicts	with	Ukraine	over	 the	 terms	and	condi-
tions	of	supplies	and	transit	of	natural	gas.	If	adopted	in	the	form	proposed	
by	Russia,	 the	 treaty	would	create	an	asymmetry	 in	 favour	of	Russia.	 In	
practice	it	would	considerably	undermine	the	position	of	the	transit	states,	
or	even	partly	 incapacitate	 them.	 It	would	offer	Russia	an	 instrument	 to	
interfere	with	the	energy	policies	and	energy	legislation	of	both	the	transit	
states	and	the	energy	buyers	in	the	EU.	It	could	undermine	the	fundamen-
tal	objectives	of	the	EU’s	energy	market	liberalisation	policy	or	even	limit	
competition	in	that	market31.
The	 EU	 side	 took	 note	 of	 Russia’s	 proposals	 and	 discussed	 them	within	 the	
framework	of	the	energy	dialogue,	but	the	differences	between	the	two	sides	
could	not	be	overcome	either	 there,	 or	 in	 the	wider	 international	 forum	 (in	
meetings	of	the	ECT	signatories).
Those	differences	were	also	reflected	in	the	dispute	over	the	implementation	
of	the	EU’s	third	energy	package,	which	concerned	the	gas	and	electricity	mar-
kets.	The	Russian	side	claimed	that	the	package,	and	especially	the	regulations	
requiring	 unrestricted	 access	 to	 transport	 infrastructures	 for	 third	 parties	
and	at	least	partial	separation	of	the	ownership	of	energy	transport	and	dis-
tribution	businesses,	contradicted	the	principles	of	investment	protection	and	
31	 Cf.	Ewa	Paszyc,	Moscow's	response	to	the	Energy	Charter	Treaty,	Eastweek,	OSW,	29	April	
2009,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2009-04-29/moscows-response-to	
-	energy-charter-treaty	
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non-discriminatory	market	access,	and	infringed	the	interests	of	Russian	com-
panies	operating	in	the	EU	market32.
Despite	those	differences,	Russia	has	consistently	pressured	the	EU	to	develop	
long-term	rules	for	co-operation	in	energy	with	a	view	to	creating	an	EU-Russia	
common	energy	space	(which	would	in	fact	also	include	the	transit	countries	in	
the	CIS	area).	Talks	on	the	subject,	launched	in	February	2011,	led	to	the	signa-
ture,	in	March	2013,	of	a	Roadmap	for	UE-Russia	Energy	Co-operation	until	2050.	
This	 general	document	outlined	a	vision	 for	 creating,	within	 this	 timeframe,	
a	pan-European	energy	area	with	 integrated	 infrastructures	and	harmonised	
legal	and	technical	regulations.	However,	it	did	not	establish	any	binding	com-
mitments,	and	phrased	the	objectives	and	tasks	in	such	general	language	that	it	
would	be	difficult	to	assess	if	they	have	been	implemented	or	not33.
Russia	also	tried	to	pursue	some	elements	of	its	Greater	Europe	concept	by	im-
plementing	multilateral co-operation projects, especially in the energy 
sector.	The	most	notable	examples	 included	 the	construction,	by	a	Russian-
German-French-Dutch	 consortium	with	Gazprom	 in	 the	 leading	 role,	 of	 the	
Nord	Stream	gas	pipeline	under	the	Baltic	Sea	bed	from	Russia	 to	Germany,	
and	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 Russian-Italian-French	 consortium	 led	 by	Gazprom	 to	
build	the	South	Stream	gas	pipeline	under	the	bottom	of	the	Black	Sea,	to	ex-
port	Russian	gas	mainly	to	the	Balkan	states	and	Italy34.
As	far	as	other,	energy-unrelated areas of economic dialogue and co-opera-
tion are	concerned,	the	Russian	side	has	shown	some	interest	in	the	automobile	
32	 See:	Agata	Łoskot-Strachota,	Ewa	Paszyc,	Rosja-UE:	spór	o	unijny	rynek	gazu,	Tydzień	na	
Wschodzie,	 OSW,	 2.03.2011,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie	
/	2011-03-02/rosja-ue-spor-o-unijny-rynek-gazu	
33	 The	document	outlined	a	vision	of	co-operation	in	the	electricity,	gas,	oil	and	renewable	energy	
sectors	and	energy-efficiency	technologies.	For	the	various	sectors	it	usually	provided	that	fea-
sibility	studies	would	be	carried	out	and	co-operation	projects	prepared	until	2020,	that	projects	
would	be	implemented	until	2030	and	that	an	integrated	energy	space	would	be	created	until	
2050.	See:	Road	Map	EU	–	Russia	Energy	Cooperation	until	2050,	Brussels,	March	2013,	http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/doc/2013_03_eu_russia_roadmap_2050_signed.pdf	
34	 For	more	information	see:	Ewa	Paszyc,	Nord	and	South	Stream	won't	save	Gazprom,	OSW	Com-
mentary,	 28	 January	2010,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2010-01-
28/	nord-and-south-stream-wont-save-gazprom;	 Ewa	 Paszyc,	 Russia:	 Gazprom	 has	 activated	
Nord	 Stream’s	 second	 pipeline,	 Eastweek,	 OSW,	 10.10.2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/eastweek/2012-10-10/russia-gazprom-has-activated-nord-stream-s-second-pipeline;	
Szymon	Kardaś,	Ewa	Paszyc,	At	any	price:	Russia	is	embarking	on	the	construction	of	South	
Stream,	 OSW	 Commentary,	 7.12.2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2012-12-07/any-price-russia-embarking-construction-south-stream	
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and	light	industries,	and	in	co-operation	in	the	areas	of	space	technology	and	
satellite	navigation	(the	latter	two	spheres	were	discussed	outside	the	frame-
work	of	dialogue	with	the	European	Commission).	Dialogue	on	fisheries	and	
phytosanitary	issues	has	also	developed	quite	robustly.	As	for	the	other	poten-
tial	areas	of	dialogue,	Russia	has	shown	little	or	no	interest35.
Since	it	was	important	for	Russia	to	implement	more	projects	that	would	pro-
mote	a	transfer	of	European	capital	and	technology	to	Russia	and	help	expand	
the	presence	of	Russian	businesses	in	the	EU	market	and	create	of	infrastruc-
tural	and	co-operative	 links,	Moscow	welcomed	the	European	Union’s	Part-
nership for Modernisation initiative.	This	co-operation	programme,	initiat-
ed	on	a	bilateral	basis	by	Germany	in	2008,	taken	over	by	the	EU	in	November	
2009	and	officially	inaugurated	at	the	EU-Russia	summit	in	Rostov-on-Don	on	
31	May–1	June	2010,	envisaged	projects	that	would	foster	the	modernisation	of	
Russia’s	economy	and	promote	closer	economic	co-operation	between	the	EU	
and	Russia.	Since	its	launch,	the	Partnership	for	Modernisation	has	been	the	
main	 framework	 for	Russia-EU	dialogue	on	 the	 implementation	of	 the	Com-
mon	Spaces	(except	for	the	External	Security	Space),	and	for	bilateral	projects	
with	the	EU	member	states	(twenty-three	of	which	have	signed	separate	docu-
ments	on	Partnership	for	Modernisation	with	Russia).	However,	the	practical	
effects	of	this	co-operation	have	remained	very	limited36.
In	 addition	 to	 the	 above,	Russian operators undertook or planned many	
other	initiatives in the EU market, aimed at acquiring or exchanging as-
sets, which	were	also	in	line	with	the	Greater	Europe	concept	as	formulated	by	
Vladimir	Putin	in	his	Süddeutsche Zeitung article37.
2.3. The sphere of human contacts
In	 the	 sphere	 of	 broadly	 understood	 people's	 relations,	 Russia’s	 efforts	 have	
been	focused	on	two	objectives:	closer	co-operation	in	research	and	education,	
and	visa-free	travel	between	Russia	and	the	EU.
35	 See:	the	EU-Russia	Common	Spaces	Progress	Report	2012,	op.cit.	
36	 See:	http://formodernisation.com/en/info/	
37	 The	subject	is	too	broad	to	be	comprehensively	covered	in	this	paper.	For	more	information,	
see	the	texts	included	in	the	CES	Project	Report	"Aktywność	gospodarcza	Rosji	za	granicą	
w	 latach	 2004-2010”,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/raport-osw/2011-08-17/akty-
wnosc-gospodarcza-rosji-za-granica-w-latach-20042010	
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As	regards	research and education,	which	accounted	for	the	bigger	part	of	the	
respective	Roadmap's	content38,	considerable	progress	has	been	made	as	there	
had	 been	 no	 significant	 differences	 of	 interests	 between	 the	 parties	 and	 the	
subject	matter	was	non-political.	In	particular,	Russia	became	actively	involved	
in	the	implementation	of	the	Bologna	process	(the	development	of	a	system	of	
European	educational	standards,	co-operation	among	universities,	student	and	
lecturer	exchanges,	etc.)	and	the	successive	EU	Framework	Programmes	(for	re-
search	projects).	It	has	become	the	most	active	non-EU	participant	in	the	Frame-
work	Programmes,	and	one	of	the	greatest	beneficiaries	of	EU	research	funding.	
The	Russian	side	has	been	mostly	interested	in	research	projects	in	the	spheres	
of	aviation,	space	research,	medicine,	environmental	protection,	new	materials,	
and	information	and	telecommunication	technologies39.
The	picture	is	quite	different	when	it	comes	to	the	free movement of peo-
ple (visa-free travel)	between	Russia	and	the	EU.	Dialogue	on	this	subject	
gained	momentum	only	in	2002,	in	the	course	of	the	Russia-EU	crisis	over	the	
Kaliningrad	Oblast.	Facing	the	plans	of	Poland	and	Lithuania	to	introduce	vi-
sas	for	Russian	nationals	as	of	2003,	and	the	two	countries'	subsequent	acces-
sion	to	the	EU	on	1	May	2004,	the	Russian	side	demanded,	in	early	2002,	that	
visa-free	 travel	 should	remain	available	 to	 those	 traveling	 to	and	 from	the	
Kaliningrad	exclave.	This,	however,	would	have	been	against	the	EU	regula-
tions.	As	 the	dispute	between	Russia	 and	 the	EU	escalated,	Moscow	unex-
pectedly	suggested	a	radical	way	out:	in	August	2002	the	Russian	president	
Vladimir	Putin	send	a	letter	to	the	European	Commission	President	and	the	
heads	of	EU	states,	 in	which	he	proposed	opening	negotiations	with	a	view	
to	 concluding	an	agreement	on	 complete	 abolition	of	visas	between	Russia	
and	the	(enlarging)	EU.	Even	though	a	compromise	on	the	Kaliningrad	tran-
sit	was	reached	in	November	2002	(providing	for	a	system	of	special	travel	
38	 Road	Map	for	the	Common	Space	of	Research	and	Education,	Including	Cultural	Aspects,	
Moscow	10May	2005,	http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/roadmap_economic_en.pdf	
39	 Under	the	6th	Framework	Programme	of	the	EU	(2002–2006),	Russian	researchers	partici-
pated	in	the	works	of	310	international	consortiums,	taking	part	in	projects	worth	a	total	of	
€	2	billion.	See:	Compendium	of	Science	and	Technology	Cooperation	between	the	Europe-
an	Union,	the	EU	Member	States	and	the	Russian	Federation,	Moscow,	August	2011,	http://
eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/more_info/compendium_of_science_tech-
nology_cooperation_between_eu_and_russia_2011_en.pdf	Under	the	7th	Framework	Pro-
gramme	of	the	EU	(2007–2013)	440	teams	from	Russia	participated	in	research	projects.	See:	
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/20120711_
en.htm	According	to	other	sources,	a	total	of	463	Russian	research	institutions	participated	
in	291	projects	that	benefited	from	a	total	of	€	63	million	of	EU	financing.	See:	the	EU-Russia	
Common	Spaces	Progress	Report	2012, op.cit.	
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documents	that	formally	were	not	visas)	the	Russian	side	continued	its	diplo-
matic	offensive	for	visa-free	travel,	hoping	that	agreement	could	be	reached	
before	the	EU	enlargement	into	Central	Europe	in	May	2004.	Although	at	the	
EU-Russia	summit	 in	May	2003	the	EU	agreed	to	set	visa-free	travel	as	the	
long-term	 objective,	 Russia's	 pressure	 to	 achieve	 a	 quick	 political	 decision	
proved	ineffective.	In	May	2006,	the	two	sides	managed	to	sign	an	agreement	
on	visa	liberalisation	which	facilitated	the	visa	rules	for	selected	categories	
of	travellers40.	It	came	into	force	in	2007.
In	the	years	that	followed,	Russia	set	another	unofficial	deadline	for	the	intro-
duction	of	visa-free	travel,	i.e.	the	Winter	Olympics	in	Sochi	in	February	2014.	
As	this	date	approached,	Russia	stepped	up	its	diplomatic	offensive.	As	part	of	
that	offensive,	Moscow	presented	a	draft	agreement	of	 the	abolition	of	visas	
for	short-term	stays	on	1	June	2010	at	the	EU-Russia	summit	in	Rostov-on-Don.	
However,	the	negotiators	once	again	only	managed	to	agree	on	further	liber-
alisation	of	 the	visa	regime	and	a	 list	of	 	 “common	steps”	 (in	 fact	conditions	
set	by	 the	EU)	 to	gradually	work	 towards	visa-free	 travel	 (December	2011)41.	
The	signature	of	the	visa	liberalisation	agreement	was	then	delayed	because	of	
the	controversies	over	Russia's	proposal	to	abolish	visas	for	the	holders	of	ser-
vice	passports42.	On	the	other	hand,	Moscow	welcomed	the	agreement	on	small	
border	traffic	between	the	Kaliningrad	oblast	and	selected	districts	of	north-
eastern	Poland,	which	was	signed	in	December	2011	and	entered	into	force	in	
July	201243.
40	 See:	the	Agreement	between	the	European	Community	and	the	Russian	Federation	on	the	
facilitation	of	the	issuance	of	visas	to	the	citizens	of	the	European	Union	and	the	Russian	
Federation,	Sochi,	25	June	2006,	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2007:129:0027:0034:EN:PDF	
41	 See:	Common	steps	towards	visa	free	short-	term	travel	of	Russian	and	EU	citizens,	http://
ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/russia/docs/
common_steps_towards_visa_free_short_term_travel_en.pdf	
42	 Russia	made	 the	 signature	of	 the	agreement	on	 further	 liberalisation	of	 the	visa	 regime	
conditional	on	 the	abolition	of	 the	visa	 requirement	 for	 the	holders	of	 service	passports	
(around	150.000	people	in	Russia,	mostly	officials,	military	and	functionaries	of	the	securi-
ty	forces).	A	preliminary	compromise	was	worked	out	during	the	negotiations,	which	stat-
ted	that	the	visa	requirements	would	be	abolished	only	for	the	holders	of	biometric	service	
passports	(which	would	significantly	reduce	the	number	of	eligible	candidates).	However,	
the	issue	remained	controversial	within	the	EU	because	of	the	potentially	negative	impres-
sion	that	such	a	decision	could	make	in	view	of	the	mounting	human	and	civil	rights	viola-
tions	in	Russia.	
43	 See:	the	Agreement	between	the	government	of	the	Republic	of	Poland	and	the	government	
of	the	Russian	Federation	regulating	small	border	traffic,	Moscow,	14.12.2011,	http://www.
msz.gov.pl/resource/fb5bab23-463d-4be2-8c2b-2bc549a4e647	
31
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
0/
20
13
The	visa	negotiations	exposed	a	number	of	problems	not	only	in	the	relations	
between	 the	EU	and	Russia,	 but	 also	 inside	 the	Union	 and	 in	Russia.	While	
Moscow	treated	the	visa	question	as	a	purely	political	 issue	and	accused	the	
EU	of	lack	of	good	will	and	double	standards,	the	EU	looked	at	the	issue	in	the	
context	of	legal,	security	and	technical	problems.	There	was	no	consensus	on	
the	visa	question	in	the	EU,	and	the	problem	was	exacerbated	by	public	senti-
ments	in	a	number	of	member	states	that	were	against	any	further	opening	of	
the	EU	borders,	fearing	excessive	migration,	including	illegal	migration,	and	
soft	security	threats	such	as	crime,	drugs	trafficking,	human	trafficking,	etc.).	
Other	problems	concerned	the	differences	between	regulations	and	practices	
related	to	migration	and	resident	registration	and	in	the	EU	and	Russia,	and	
the	increasingly	negative	European	perceptions	of	the	human	rights	situation	
and	the	rule	of	law	in	Russia.
3. European and Eurasian integration: convergence
Shortly	after	President	Vladimir	Putin	publicly	formulated	his	new	version	of	
the	Greater	Europe	concept	(2001)	as	a	common	space	of	Russia	and	the	EU,	the	
Russian	side	started	sending	clear	signals	that	it	did	not	see	the	project	as	an	
alternative	to	its	own	efforts	aimed	at	economic,	political	and	defence	integra-
tion	in	the	post-Soviet	area.	Instead,	high-ranking	Russian	officials	argued	that	
the	process	at	hand	was	about	the	convergence	of	two	integration	processes.
As	 early	 as	May	 2002,	 President	 Putin	 called	 for	 co-operation	 between	 the	
EU	and	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community44	 (established	in	2000	by	Russia,	
Belarus,	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan,	and	formally	joined	by	Uz-
bekistan	in	early	2006).	Over	time,	however,	a	different	project	became	more	
important	for	Moscow:	that	of	the	Common	Economic	Space	(CES)	of	Russia,	
Belarus,	Ukraine	and	Kazakhstan.	The	countries	initiated	the	project	in	Feb-
ruary	2003	and	made	formal	arrangements	for	it	in	September	that	year.	Even	
before	that	happened,	in	June	2003,	the	then	Russian	deputy	prime	minister	
Viktor	Khristenko	sent	a	letter	to	Brussels	with	a	proposal	to	analyse	the	com-
patibility	of	integration	processes	in	Western	(the	EU)	and	Eastern	Europe	(the	
CES)45.	At	 the	same	time,	Khristenko	published	an	article	devoted	mainly	to	
this	question	of	compatibility	in	the	Rossiyskaya Gazeta daily.	He	wrote:
44	 RIA-Novosti,	13	May	2002.
45	 Information	obtained	by	the	author	in	2003	from	sources	in	the	European	institutions.
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“Russia is interested in integration with its neighbours in the CIS and in 
developing relations with the European Union. These two are not alterna-
tive directions – they mutually complement each other: an alliance of post-
Soviet republics will be better positioned to develop relations with Europe. (…) It 
is obvious that creating an economic space will be beneficial for Russia both in 
the Eastern (the CIS) and the Western dimension (the EU). These two processes 
could progress in isolation, or on the contrary, they could be linked, and 
thus mutually enrich themselves and gradually consolidate a sphere of 
economic integration which, in terms of the size of its population, would 
be three times as big as Russia. We think that for us [Russia] the second 
variant is preferable and more realistic. Such is the conclusion from our re-
cent experience of consultations with our partners in the two formats – the Com-
mon Economic Space with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the Common 
European Economic Space (CEES). (…) Integration processes involving the 
CIS countries may progress faster than the formation of the CEES – our 
countries represent more similar levels of economic development and competition, 
and much has already been done for the mutual opening of markets, while our 
economic regulations are still being made and are therefore easier to harmonise. 
It is therefore all the more important to carefully consider some of the necessary 
measures, so that in future they can be applied in dialogue with the European Un-
ion. (…) The establishment of a single economic space with Russia and our 
neighbours in the East and the West is a long-term objective. Its individual 
inter-state elements may develop faster than others, depending on the real readi-
ness of each state to pursue deeper integration. An analogy to a ‘multi-speed Eu-
rope’ is quite justified here. (…) As this ‘trans-European space’ develops, its gravity 
will increase, attracting more and more CIS countries and our other neighbours. 
This will create a new quality of economic collaboration in the vast terri-
tory of Eurasia, which may become a key growth factor.”46
The	circumstances	of	Khristenko’s	statement	are	noteworthy.	It	was	published	
two	months	after	the	European	Commission	adopted	a	communication	on	the	Eu-
ropean	Neighbourhood	Policy	(the	EU’s	first	public	concept	document	on	the	sub-
ject),	and	one	day	after	the	EU	Council	adopted	its	Conclusions	on	the	ENP,	which	
marked	the	political	decision	to	launch	this	new	political	initiative	addressed	to	
46	 Единое экономическое пространство: политические амбиции или экономическая целе­
сообразность? Статья заместителя Председателя Правительства России В.Б. Христ енко, 
опубликованная в «Российской газете» 17 июня 2003 года под заголовком «Станет ли 
«четвёрка» единицей?»,	17	June	2003,	http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rsng.nsf/0e82a568fbb5
b2c043256a65002f56c2/c325749c004f293343256d48002acc15!OpenDocument
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the	Union’s	eastern	partners	among	others47.	It	is	clear	that	Khristenko	had	been	
authorised	to	send	a	clear	political	signal	to	the	EU.	It	was	intended	to	be	read	
as	follows:	Russia	does	not	object	to	contacts	between	the	EU	and	the	CIS	coun-
tries,	but	such	contacts	should	be	mediated	by	Russia	and	take	place	under	 its	
supervision;	and	the	Common	Economic	Space	of	Russia,	Ukraine,	Belarus	and	
Kazakhstan	(and	in	the	longer	term,	its	successive	new	CIS	members)	should	be	
the	European	Union’s	partner	for	dialogue,	co-operation,	and	subsequently,	par-
tial	integration.	The	text	of	the	article	also	suggested	that	in	Moscow’s	view,	Eura-
sian	integration	should	come	before	Russia’s	integration	with	the	European	area.
Declarations	such	as	this	showed	that	for	Moscow,	the	EU’s	recognition	of	Rus-
sia	as	the	centre	of	its	own	regional	integration	project	in	the	CIS	was	in	fact	
a	precondition	for	the	formation	of	Greater	Europe.	One	could	go	even	further	
and	argue	 that	 the	very	 initiative	of	Greater	Europe	had	emerged	 in	part	as	
a	response	to	the	European	Union’s	rising	activity	in	the	eastern	neighbour-
hood,	which	Russia	perceived	as	a	challenge.
This	 reasoning	was	 visible	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 statements	made	 by	 the	 then	
Deputy	Foreign	Minister	of	Russia,	Vladimir	Chizhov,	made	during	the	course	
of	2004.	Chizhov	criticised,	sometimes	harshly,	the	developing	European	Neigh-
bourhood	Policy,	 even	 to	 the	point	of	accusing	 the	EU	of	attempts	at	building	
a	 cordon sanitaire	 of	 subordinated	 countries	 (March	 2004,	 Bratislava).	 On	 the	
other	hand,	Chizhov	called	for	the	synchronisation	and	co-ordination	of	 inte-
gration	processes	in	the	EU	and	the	CIS,	and	proposed	the	establishment	of	close	
contacts	between	the	European	Union	and	the	Commonwealth	of	Independent	
States.	In	doing	so,	he	repeated	Khristenko’s	argument	that	the	two	integration	
processes	were	complementary,	and	that	the	process	of	creating	a	single	space	in	
the	CIS	did	take	EU	norms	and	standards	into	account	(November	2004,	Berlin)48.
47	 See	‘Communication	from	the	European	Commission	to	the	Council	and	the	European	Par-
liament.	Wider	Europe-Neighbourhood:	A	New	Framework	for	Relations	with	our	Eastern	
and	 Southern	Neighbours,	 Brussels’,	 11	March	 2003,	 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com03_104_en.pdf;	‘Council	Conclusions	on	Wider	Europe-New	Neighbourhood’,	Brussels	
16	June	2003,	http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/cc06_03.pdf
48	 Выступление заместителя министра иностранных дел России В. А. Чижова на кон­
ференции “Расширяющаяся Европа: новая повестка дня” по теме “Черноморское и ка­
вказское соседство Европы” Братислава, 19 марта,	19	March	2004,	http://www.mid.ru/
bdomp/dip_vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717c733c32567370042ee43/5cab9ebee9ab1fb1c3256e9b0033c
3ae!OpenDocument;	“Европейский Союз и СНГ: Новые Контуры Сотрудничества”.	State-
ment	by	deputy	minister	V.	Chizhov	at	the	“Vision	of	Europe”	conference,	Berlin	19	Novem-
ber	2004,	http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-dos.nsf/162979df2beb9880432569e70041fd1e/4325
69d800223f34c3256f520055371a!OpenDocument
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III. CONCLUSIONS:  
GREATER EUROPE – HOW, WHY AND WHAT NExT?
1. The concept and the circumstances in which it was championed
By	 analysing	Russia’s	 declarations	 as	well	 as	 its	 actions,	 one	 can	 roughly	
reconstruct	the Russian idea of Greater Europe.	This	should	be	a	common	
space	 founded	on	 two	pillars:	 the	EU	area,	with	a	dominant	 role	 for	Ger-
many	(the	Western	pillar),	and	the	area	of	the	Russian-controlled	Eurasian	
Union.	The	two	areas	would	be	interlinked	through	a	network	of	political,	
economic	and	security	 institutions.	The	partly	 integrated	common	space,	
founded	on	harmonised	norms	and	regulations,	should	ensure	freedom	of	
movement	for	people	and	goods	and	–	perhaps	with	some	restrictions	–	la-
bour	force	and	capital.	The	most	important	decisions	concerning	its	devel-
opment	would	be	taken	unanimously	(which	would	offer	Russia	the	ability	
to	de facto	 influence	the	policies	of	the	 ‘Western	sphere’	countries),	but	at	
the	same	time	the	parties,	and	Russia	in	particular,	would	keep	their	free-
dom	and	autonomy	to	decide	on	internal	affairs	and	external	relations	with	
other	countries	and	regions.
It	is	worth	noting	the	circumstances	in	which	the	Russian	declarations	on	Great-
er	Europe	were	voiced.	These	were	moments	that	–	from	Russia’s	point	of	view	
–	were	significant,	or	sometimes	even	represented	breakthroughs,	in	terms	of	
its	European	policy,	more	often	in	the	positive	sense,	as	opportunities	for	Russia,	
but	sometimes	also	in	the	negative	way,	as	new	challenges	for	Moscow.	These	
included	 the	 normalisation	 and	 institutionalisation	 of	 Russian-Western	 rela-
tions	in	1996–1997	after	the	temporary	crisis	over	the	wars	in	Chechnya	and	Bos-
nia	&	Herzegovina	(1994–1996);	the	terror	attacks	of	11	September	2001	and	the	
transient	 ‘pro-Western	turn’	in	Russia’s	policy	that	led	to	the	establishment	of	
closer	co-operation	with	the	West	in	2001;	the	Russian-Western	clash	over	the	
EU	neighbourhood	policy	and	the	‘colour	revolutions’	in	the	CIS	in	2003–2005,	
but	 also	 the	 reactivation	 of	 the	 Russia-Germany-France	 triangle	 against	 the	
background	of	the	Iraq	war	in	2003–2005;	another	normalisation	of	Russia-West	
relations	 in	 2009-2011	 after	 the	 temporary	 crisis	 engendered	by	 the	Russian-
Georgian	war	(2008–2009),	and	the	emergence	from	the	financial	and	economic	
crisis	in	2008–2009.	The	declarations	were	voices	in	the	debates	of	the	day	in	the	
West,	including	debates	on	the	relations	with	Russia.
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2. Background of the concept’s objectives
The	concept	of	Greater	Europe	cannot	be	analysed	in	isolation	from	the	Russian	
elite’s	perceptions	of	reality	and	its	diagnosis	of	the	international	situation,	or	
the	foreign	policy	strategies	built	on	that	basis.	In	this	context	the	following	
elements	should	be	underlined:
The United States remains	the	main	point	of	reference	for	Russia.	The	Kremlin	
considers	the	US	as	a	declining	global	power,	but	one	which	nevertheless	still	
poses	 the	main	challenge	 to	 the	 interests	of	 the	Russian	Federation.	Standing	
up	to	what	Moscow	believes	to	be	the	United	States’	efforts	to	establish	global	
hegemony	has	been	and	remains	the	main	imperative	of	Russia’s	foreign	policy.
From	this	point	of	view,	the	Greater	Europe	concept	is	clearly	anti-American.	
Its	main	objective	is	to	create	a	Russian-European	alliance	to	rival	the	United	
States	in	the	political	and	economic	dimension.	It	should	serve	to	build	Europe’s	
‘independence’	from	the	United	States,	which	in	practice	should	entail	the	ero-
sion	of	trans-Atlantic	relations	and	structures	(especially	NATO)	and	push	the	
US	away	from	Europe.	It	is	no	accident	that	Russia’s	declarations	were	mainly	
addressed	 to	European	countries	which,	 like	Germany	and	France,	had	dis-
tanced	themselves	from	US	policy	on	various	occasions,	seeking	to	reinforce	
their	own	positions	in	international	politics.
The European Union is	Russia’s	main	economic	partner,	and	in	particular	 its	
main	market	for	the	energy	resources	which	are	the	cornerstone	of	Russia’s	econ-
omy.	However,	Russia	has	never	perceived	or	treated	the	EU	as	a	real	commu-
nity.	Rather,	it	has	viewed	the	EU	as	a	concert	of	European	powers	with	Germany,	
France,	the	UK	and	Italy	in	the	leading	roles.	Moscow	has	been	developing	par-
ticularly	close	co-operation	with	this	group	(in	which	the	UK	is	a	relatively	recent	
arrival)	while	stimulating	competition	among	 its	members	 for	privileged	rela-
tions	with	Russia.	In	particular	Germany	and	France,	the	two	countries	Russia	
believes	to	be	the	political	engine	of	the	EU,	have	been	given	special	treatment,	
also	as	the	addressees	of	the	Greater	Europe	concept	for	which	the	Moscow-Ber-
lin-Paris	triangle	was	supposed	to	be	one	of	the	main	tools	for	implementation.	
The	financial	and	economic	crisis	of	2008–9	has	strengthened	Germany’s	domi-
nant	position	in	Europe,	and	in	this	way	also	augmented	the	country’s	role	as	the	
key	partner	for	the	development	of	Greater	Europe	in	Moscow’s	eyes.
The	European	powers,	and	Germany	in	particular,	were	supposed	to	be	the	
main	 promoters	 of	 economic,	 energy,	 political	 and	 security	 deals	 between	
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Europe	and	Russia,	due	to	their	sway	over	the	European	structures.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 bilateral	 energy,	 industrial	 and	 defence	 deals	 with	 Germany,	
France	and	Italy	were	supposed	to	constitute	the	very	network	of	relations	
which	would	be	 the	 substance	of	 the	 emerging	Greater	Europe.	Both	were	
intended	to	help	expand	Russia’s	influence	on	processes	and	decisions	in	Eu-
ropean	politics,	economy	and	security;	first	 informally,	and	then	(with	the	
appropriate	institutions	in	place)	formally	as	well.	In	this	way	Russia	hoped	
to	 expand	 its	 economic	 presence	 in	 Europe,	 gain	wider	 access	 to	 EU	mar-
kets,	create	and	control	transnational	holdings	by	exchanging	business	as-
sets	with	EU	countries,	and	obtain	capital	&	high	technology	transfers	from	
the	 leading	 European	 countries.	 Interestingly,	 Moscow	 seemed	 to	 believe	
that	 such	 deepening	 Russian-European	 interdependence	 could	 in	 fact	 be-
come	asymmetric	in	Russia’s	favour,	and	that	Russia	would	retain	not	only	
full	freedom	in	internal	politics,	but	also	unrestricted	room	for	manoeuvre	
in	foreign	policy.	The	purpose	of	Greater	Europe	was	not	for	Russia	somehow	
to	‘dissolve’	into	the	new	political,	economic	and	security	structure;	on	the	
contrary,	 it	was	to	strengthen	the	potential	and	 independence	of	Russia	as	
a	great	global	power.	The	network	of	relations	built	as	part	of	Greater	Europe	
was	supposed	to	offer	Russia	instruments	to	influence	European	politics	in	
line	with	its	own	interests,	while	at	the	same	time	preventing	European	ac-
tors	from	trying	to	influence	Russia’s	internal	and	foreign	policy.
China	is,	on	the	one	hand,	a	key	partner	for	Moscow,	and	on	the	other,	a	ma-
jor	challenge	 to	 it.	Russia	has	been	observing	 the	dynamic	rise	of	China's	
power	and	international	clout	with	some	concern,	and	has	opted	for	closer	
co-operation	with	Beijing	as	the	main	element	of	its	political	tactics.	At	the	
same	 time,	Russia	obsessively	 fears	attempts	by	 the	United	States	 to	 take	
advantage	of	the	tensions	and	clashes	of	interests	between	itself	and	China.	
Still,	Moscow	has	been	 seeking	 to	 strengthen	 its	position	vis-à-vis	China	
and	to	balance	the	rising	power	of	the	latter.	Its	co-operation	with	the	key	
European	partners	is	one	way	of	doing	this,	and	undoubtedly	the	creation	of	
Greater	Europe	was	also	intended	as	part	of	this	strategy.	And	even	though	
Russia	never	names	China	directly	as	one	of	the	reasons	for	its	pursuit	of	
Greater	Europe,	its	rivalry	with	the	Middle	Kingdom	undoubtedly	strongly	
colours	 the	 subtext	 of	 this	 initiative.	 Paradoxically,	 this	has	not	 changed	
even	with	Russia’s	‘turn	towards	Asia’,	which	Moscow	has	been	promoting	
particularly	 actively	 since	 2012,	 and	which	was	 in	part	 a	 response	 to	 the	
analogous	 policy	 of	 the	United	 States.	 That	 is	 because	 in	 seeking	 to	 play	
a	 greater	 role	 in	 the	Asia-Pacific	 region,	Russia	 intends	 to	 strengthen	 its	
position	 through	 co-operation	 with	 Europe,	 among	 other	 measures.	 On	
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the	other	hand	it	is	clearly	noticeable,	especially	in	the	energy	sphere,	that	
Moscow	is	trying	to	play	the	‘Chinese	card’	and	use	the	prospects	offered	by	
the	Asian	markets	to	mobilise	its	European	partners	in	order	to	try	harder	
to	develop	good	relations	with	Russia.
Russia	treats	the CIS area as	its	natural	sphere	of	influence,	one	of	the	fun-
daments	and	hallmarks	of	 its	 status	as	a	global	power.	 It	has	 long	sought	 to	
transform	this	area	into	a	Russian-managed	centre	of	political,	economic	and	
security	integration.	Most	importantly,	however,	Moscow	does	not	want	any	
other	actors	(whether	states	or	integration	structures),	such	as	the	US,	EU	or	
China,	to	challenge	its	strategic	control	of	the	area.	Russia	stepped	up	its	in-
tegration	efforts	in	2009,	pushing	for	the	creation	of	the	Customs	Union	and	
subsequently,	the	Common	Economic	Space,	which	is	ultimately	to	become	the	
Eurasian	Union.
The	Greater	Europe	concept	could	at	first	seem	to	offer	an	alternative	to	the	
policy	of	Russia	as	outlined	above;	but	 this	 is	not	 the	case,	at	 least	 in	view	
of	 the	concept's	original	assumptions.	As	 the	concept	developed,	 it	became	
increasingly	clear	that	Russia's	objective	was	not	only	to	build	links	between	
itself	and	the	EU,	but	indeed	to	create	a	two-bloc	structure	that	would	bind	
together	two	areas	of	integration	–	the	European	Union	in	the	West,	and	the	
Eurasian	 Union	 in	 the	 East.	 Thus,	 the	 implementation	 of	 Greater	 Europe	
would	in	fact	permanently	split	Europe,	largely	along	the	former	Soviet	bor-
ders	(excepting	the	Baltic	states).	It	would	also	legitimise	and	institutionalise	
this	split.	Western	countries,	and	the	EU	in	particular,	would	in	effect	have	
to	give	up	any	attempts	at	integrating	the	countries	of	the	shared	neighbour-
hood,	 especially	Ukraine,	 into	 the	European	 space	based	 on	EU	 legislation	
and	standards,	and	accept	Russia's	hegemony	in	this	area.	Russia	would	be	
the	one	to	regulate	–	through	the	bodies	of	the	Eurasian	Union	–	the	political	
and	economic	relations	of	countries	in	Eastern	Europe,	the	South	Caucasus	
and	Central	Asia	with	the	European	Union.	In	practice	it	would	be	Moscow	
who	determined	whether,	and	to	what	extent,	European	standards	could	be	
implemented	in	this	area.
If	implementation	of	the	Greater	Europe	concept	has	ultimately	proved	unfea-
sible,	the	Eurasian	Union	could	become	a	real	alternative	to	it.	Problems	in	cre-
ating	the	Eurasian	Union,	on	the	other	hand,	would	mobilise	Russia	to	hamper	
the	European	Union's	policy	efforts	in	the	shared	neighbourhood.
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3. Greater Europe: a realistic programme or a political utopia?
Greater	Europe	has	always	appeared	in	the	statements	by	Russian	leaders,	and	
especially	Vladimir	Putin,	as	a	slogan.	It	has	never	been	elaborated	on	in	detail,	
in	any	more	or	less	formal	document.	Vladimir	Putin's	article	published	in	the	
Süddeutsche Zeitung	in	November	2010	remains	its	single	most	specific	public	
formulation,	but	even	that	text	offers	only	a	general	indication	of	the	concept's	
objectives	and	methods	of	implementation.
On	the	other	hand,	it	is	evident	that	a	number	of	initiatives	Russia	has	under-
taken	within	the	framework	of	its	policy	towards	the	EU	and	European	coun-
tries	are	 in	 line	with	 the	declared	objectives	of	 the	Greater	Europe	concept.	
Thus,	Greater	Europe	is	not	merely	an	empty	slogan,	but	rather	a	political	pro-
gramme,	even	if	stated	in	as	yet	rather	general	terms.	The	idea	has	regularly	
recurred	in	moments	of	rising	dynamics	in	Russia's	interactions	with	the	key	
European	states,	i.e.	at	times	of	upheavals	and	turning	points	in	international	
politics	and	the	economy.
Yet	if	one	looks	at	the	results	of	the	Russian	initiatives	aimed	at	putting	some	
elements	of	the	Greater	Europe	concept	into	practice,	one	cannot	help	but	no-
tice	that	they	are	negligible.	In	the security sphere,	no	new	European	security	
system	that	would	challenge	the	domination	of	NATO	and	let	Russia	co-decide	
has	been	created,	despite	many	years	of	systematic	efforts	on	Russia’s	part.	The	
idea	of	concluding	a	new	European	security	treaty	has	ended	in	failure.
In	the economy,	Russia	finally	acceded	to	the	WTO	in	2012.	However,	once	it	
did	so,	 it	 focused	 its	efforts	on	exploiting	 loopholes	and	separate	 interpreta-
tions	in	the	detailed	terms	of	its	accession	to	obstruct	the	removal	of	trade	bar-
riers,	including	barriers	in	trade	with	the	EU.	The	prospect	of	a	Deep	and	Com-
prehensive	Free	Trade	Agreement	between	the	EU	and	Russia	has	become	even	
more	distant,	 instead	of	coming	closer.	 It	 is	 true	that	Russian	and	European	
companies	have	signed	a	number	of	co-operation	agreements,	a	couple	of	busi-
nesses	in	Europe	have	been	acquired	by	Russian	companies,	and	in	some	cases	
Russian	and	EU	companies	have	swapped	assets.	However	this	has	not	created	
any	breakthroughs	in	industrial	or	technology	co-operation.
As	 regards	energy,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 impression	 that	 not	 only	 is	 the	Rus-
sian-proposed	 single	 European	 energy	 space	 based	 on	 rules	 different	 from	
the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	an	 impossible	project,	but	 also	 the	 energy	 inter-
ests	of	the	EU	and	Russia	are	increasingly	contradictory.	The	dispute	about	the	
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implementation	of	the	Third	Energy	Package	and	the	European	Commission's	
investigation	of	Gazprom’s	alleged	illegal	monopolistic	practices	are	only	the	
most	important	examples	of	this	clash.
In	the	sphere	of	human relations, a	series	of	small	steps	have	been	made	to-
wards	liberalising	the	visa	regime	between	Russia	and	the	EU,	but	the	pros-
pects	of	complete	abolition	of	visas	remains	uncertain,	despite	immense	politi-
cal	pressure	from	Russia.
Finally, in the political sphere,	no	new	permanent	body	has	been	established	
to	serve	as	a	forum	for	Russia	and	the	EU	to	arrange	consultations	and	deci-
sion-making	on	political	and	security	issues,	despite	Moscow's	lobbying.	The	
Moscow-Berlin-Paris	triangle	meets	only	irregularly,	and	has	served	more	as	
an	 image-building	measure	 than	 any	 real	 decision-making	 centre.	Moscow	
has	also	 failed	 to	persuade	 the	EU	and	 its	member	 states	 to	 formally	 recog-
nise	 the	Customs	Unions	or	 the	Common	Economic	Space	of	Russia,	Belarus	
and	Kazakhstan	as	a	partner	with	whom	to	conclude	agreements.	After	many	
years	of	negotiations,	Russia	and	the	EU	have	not	even	been	able	to	agree	on	
the	provisions	of	a	new	framework	agreement	for	their	mutual	relations,	the	
so-called	PCA	2.
Russia's	biggest	frustration	has	probably	been	the	attitude	of	the	government	
of	Germany,	which	Moscow	hoped	would	be	 its	main	partner	 in	 the	 imple-
mentation	of	the	Greater	Europe	project.	Although	Berlin	has	always	been	at	
the	forefront	of	European	economic	and	energy	co-operation	with	Russia,	ten-
sions	and	differences	on	certain	 important	 issues	have	 increasingly	become	
apparent	 between	 the	 two	 sides,	 especially	 since	 2012.	While	 Germany	 has	
called	for	the	establishment	of	a	new	consultation	body	between	the	EU	and	
Russia	 alongside	with	Moscow,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 Russians	were	 dissatisfied	
with	Berlin’s	failure	to	ensure	consensus	on	this	in	the	EU.	Germany	has	fa-
voured	further	 liberalisation	of	the	visa	regime	between	the	EU	and	Russia,	
but	it	has	also	been	clearly	reluctant	to	set	any	deadlines	for	the	complete	aboli-
tion	of	visas.	Increasingly	frequent	German	criticism	of	civil	rights	violations	
in	Russia	has	also	been	vexing	Moscow.	Furthermore,	the	Kremlin	also	holds	
a	grudge	against	Germany	over	 the	strong	support	provided	by	 the	German	
EU	energy	commissioner	Günther	Oettinger	 to	Ukraine	as	 it	defended	 itself	
against	 pressure	 from	Russia.	 The	Kremlin	 apparently	 suspects	 that	 Berlin	
was	behind	the	European	Commission’s	investigation	of	Gazprom,	seeing	this	
as	a	way	to	force	Russia	to	reduce	the	price	of	its	gas	exports.	Finally,	Germany	
was	the	main	decision-maker	during	the	Cyprus	crisis	 in	spring	2013,	when	
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the	deal	between	 the	Eurogroup	and	Cyprus	 (which	had	not	been	consulted	
with	Russia)	delivered	a	blow	to	 the	extensive	business	 interests	of	Russian	
oligarchs	and	companies	in	that	country.
This	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	if	the	Russian	leadership	really	believed	that	
it	would	find	strong	partners	in	the	EU	to	put	at	least	some	of	the	objectives	of	
Greater	Europe	into	practice,	 this	was	a	mistaken	calculation.	Two	different	
approaches	clashed	here.	Russia	sought	to	conclude	a	series	of	strategic	agree-
ments	with	the	EU	based	on	new,	jointly	negotiated	principles,	and	fill	them	
with	specific	content	 later	on.	Meanwhile	Europe	wanted	to	pull	Russia	into	
the	European	system	of	norms	and	standards,	and	pursue	pragmatic	co-oper-
ation	where	the	two	sides’	interests	coincided.
Moscow	underestimated	the	strength	of	trans-Atlantic	relations	and	the	aver-
sion	of	European	states	to	the	idea	of	considerably	revising	the	European	insti-
tutional	order,	and	overestimated	its	attractiveness	as	a	partner	for	co-opera-
tion	in	key	spheres.	Most	importantly,	however,	even	during	the	short	periods	
in	which	it	was	willing	to	co-operate	with	Europe	more	intensely,	it	was	not	
prepared	 to	undergo	 real	 internal	 transformation,	 including	political	 trans-
formation,	without	which	building	a	common	European	space	with	Russia	is	
impossible.	Russia's	current	policy	course	is	 in	fact	driving	it	away	from	Eu-
rope.	Until	that	changes,	not	only	will	the	idea	of	Greater	Europe,	which	seems	
impossible	to	carry	out	in	the	form	intended	by	Russia,	remain	a	political	uto-
pia,	but	so	will	any	other	form	of	partial	European	integration	of	Russia.
In	 this	 situation,	Russia	 is	 likely	 to	 focus	 its	political	 energy	on	 implement-
ing	its	priority	project	of	Eurasian	integration,	based	on	the	structures	of	the	
Customs	Union	/	Common	Economic	Space	/	the	Eurasian	Union.	Moscow's	key	
short-term	objective	in	this	context	will	be	to	make	Ukraine	part	of	the	process.	
The	implementation	of	the	more	ambitious	Greater	Europe	project	–	unless	it	
is	scrapped	altogether	–	will	be	postponed	until	the	time	when,	as	the	Russian	
leaders	believe,	a	weakened	European	Union	will	become	more	inclined	to	take	
up	Russia's	proposals.
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Map.	Greater	Europe	in	Vladimir	Putin’s	concept
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